

CHAPTER ELEVEN

Interrogating Illusionism

ANAND JAYPRAKASH VAIDYA

1 INTRODUCTION: FOUR KINDS OF ILLUSIONISM

In “Illusionism and Givenness” (2017) and “Cognitive Illusions and Immediate Experience: Perspectives from Buddhist Philosophy” (chap. 10), Jay Garfield argues for four kinds of illusionism.

*Phenomenal illusionism*¹ holds that phenomenal consciousness is illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, *what-it's-like* properties, whether physical or nonphysical. *Structural illusionism* holds that the subject-object dichotomy of intentional consciousness is an illusion. There really is no subject that is distinct from an object. It just seems that way because of how we construct experience based on our brains. *Foundational illusionism* holds that it is illusions all the way down. All of the content of our experience is illusory in some sense. *Accuracy illusionism* holds that we are subjects of a persistent and constant illusion—an illusion under which what is presented to us in experience appears as if it is an accurate record of what is real and independent of the appearance. That is, we are subject to an illusion of the kind where what we see, for example, doesn't really reveal anything about how things are, but we are drawn to that in our experience.²

Garfield draws on Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Dōgen. He finds an alliance between these figures and twentieth-century Analytic

I must thank Jay Garfield and Galen Strawson for comments and criticism. Although I strived to take sides between them (they conflict with each other), I decided to be honest about where my own views lead, aiming to go beyond the opposition between them. Thanks to Manjula Rajan and Anya Farennikova for comments and discussion.

philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, Quine, Feyerabend, and Sellars. His cross-cultural and multidisciplinary philosophical goal is to defend these illusionist theses because they are at the root of our primal confusion, leading to our suffering. Something I will comment on critically at the close of this essay.

I propose to show that one can resist phenomenal, structural, and foundational illusionism because they are false and provide a confused account of the human condition. Although accuracy illusionism is central to Garfield's project, I shall not discuss it. There are, indeed, illusory aspects of our experience, but that doesn't mean it is all illusion. Garfield holds the extreme position constituted by phenomenal, structural, and foundational illusionism. I argue that (i) it cannot be illusions all the way down in the sense that we never fully track any property of the world; (ii) phenomenal realism does not succumb to the Myth of the Given—one of Garfield's arguments for rejecting it; and (iii) the subject-object duality of conscious experience is not an illusion. Like Garfield, I also see an alliance between Indian philosophers and twentieth-century philosophers. I draw upon Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara from the Nyāya tradition, and Wittgenstein, Fodor, Tyler Burge, Galen Strawson, and Kevin Falvey from the Anglo-analytic tradition.

Let me close this introduction with an illusionist thesis I do endorse. *Incompleteness illusionism* holds that perception of the world is illusory because it is incomplete with respect to the world as a unified totality.³ My inspiration for endorsing incompleteness illusionism derives from the first two lines of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*.⁴

1.0: The world is everything that is the case.

1.1: The world is the totality of facts, not of things.

If one accepts these claims, then incompleteness illusionism is based on the fact that perception is essentially perspectival and that the world is never presented singularly and completely. Incompleteness illusionism doesn't rest on whether one takes a realist reading of 1.0 and 1.1, where there is only *one* set of facts, or an anti-realist reading, where there are *multiple* sets of facts depending on whose world we are talking about. The argument below presents a line of reasoning that aims to show that we never see anything completely.

Argument for Incompleteness Illusionism

1. The world is everything that is the case, it consists of the totality of facts. It is a complete entity.
2. All perceptions are of the world, but only a part of the world is presented in any perception.
3. So, the world is never presented completely.

4. So, every perception is a presentation of the world other than it is.
5. If every perception is a presentation of the world other than it is, then every perception has illusory content pertaining to the world as a *complete entity*.
6. So, every perception has illusory content pertaining to the world as a complete entity.⁵

2 ARGUMENT AGAINST FOUNDATIONAL ILLUSIONISM

Vasubandhu, at *Verse 1* of his *Twenty Verses*, holds that all we ever experience is appearance.

This is all appearance only; for even non-existent objects are presented to us, as, for instance, a person with faulty vision sees unreal hairs, etc.

(Das 2018: 430)

Vasubandhu goes on to compare waking life to dreaming life. At *Verse 3*⁶ and *4*⁷ he argues that just as there are no external objects in a dream, but appearances only, in waking life there are, thus, only appearances, and no external objects.⁸

Garfield's version of Buddhist illusionism appears stronger than Vasubandhu's appearance only thesis. Garfield endorses foundational illusionism, that it is illusions all the way down:

[I]f we thought that the moral of Buddhist illusionism was that we only encounter *experiences* instead of real objects, we are wrong: It is that we don't even encounter real experiences, only illusions of experiences. And if we thought, with a bit more sophistication that our encounter with those illusions was even an encounter with *actual illusions*, we are wrong, there, too: We only see illusions of illusions.[chap. 10: 259–60]⁹

Garfield appeals to the Japanese Zen Buddhist philosopher Dōgen to illustrate foundational illusionism:

[Dōgen] rejects the seemingly obvious idea that although we apprehend only appearances (painted rice cakes), something real stands behind them (real, non-painted rice cakes). Instead, he suggests, it is painted rice cakes all the way down. Mountains and waters ... are painted as well. Nothing in our experience can be described as something that we encounter as it is: Our very experiencing it can only be understood as a way to paint it. Perception and conception are constructive, not reproductive.¹⁰ [chap. 10: 259]

Foundational illusionism fails to consider the metaphysics of illusion in relation to reality from the perspective of conceptual coherence. Illusory experiences are asymmetrically dependent on real experiences. It is only because we have real experiences that we can make sense of saying something is an illusion. The concepts are conceptually related to one another.

Argument against Foundational Illusionism

1. Illusions are asymmetrically dependent on reality. You can't have an illusion of *F* unless either (i) you have experienced *F* or (ii) you have experienced something(s) *G, H, I*, which either alone or in combination are *F-like* and can be a basis for the illusion of *F*.
2. If there exists an infinite descending chain of illusions or web of illusions, then there would be nothing that grounds the possibility of having an illusion. There cannot be illusions all the way down in the same way as there cannot be lies all the way down.
3. So, some experiences are not illusory with respect to some of their content, even if much of what is constructed on the basis of them is illusory.

To defend the argument, I first turn to Vātsyāyana, a leading expositor of Gautama's *Nyāya-Sūtras*. He responded to a Buddhist who claimed that there is no difference between waking and dreaming with respect to external objects.¹¹

Argument against Waking Life Being Similar to Dreaming Life

1. The experience of external objects (by way of *pramāṇas*) is false and misleading, akin to the experience of dream objects. (hypothesis for *reductio*).
2. Dream objects are known to be false only in contrast with real objects, experienced in waking life (as apprehended by *pramāṇas*).
3. If we do not experience real objects in waking life, we do not know dream objects to be false.
4. We do know dream objects to be false.
5. Therefore, we do (generally) experience real objects in waking life (by way of *pramāṇas*).

For additional support I turn to Uddyotakara, a later commentator on the *Nyāya-Sūtras*. He draws on parasitism to refute a Buddhist who considers motion to be unreal.

All false cognitions imitate primary cognitions. You must state the original cognitions upon which the false ones are based. For we never find such a

difference (between imitators and genuine things) without an original, as seen in the case of a mistaken cognition of a post as a man. There being an existing post, one has the cognition "that is a post" regarding a person (in the distance). Or, there being a man, a post is mistaken for a man.

(Dasti 2012: 4)

Thus, if we blur the line between illusions and reality or eliminate reality, we cannot understand what an illusion is.

Turning to twentieth-century Anglo-analytic philosophers of mind, I will use Jerry Fodor's work to support premise (1); and Tyler Burge's work to explain the clarification at clause (ii) of (1).

In *A Theory of Content and Other Essays* (1990), Fodor articulated a view of mental content known as causal asymmetric dependence, that error is asymmetrically dependent on truth. It is because we possess, for example, the concept of a cow based on interactions with cows that we can make the mistake of applying the concept of a cow to a horse. The possibility of error in applying the concept cow rests on the genuine possession of the concept of a cow, such that it is a misapplication as opposed to some other kind of failing. That is, error presupposes truth. Adapting Fodor's example to the famous case of the post seen as a person, his view exactly corresponds to Uddyotakara's: It would be impossible to see the post as a person if one didn't possess the concept of a person through reliable interaction with persons.

Concepts don't always track reality. There are no centaurs, but we have the concept of a centaur: The parts that go into a centaur, the upper body of a human and the lower body of a horse, all exist. Now consider witches: A tribe could believe there are witches, without seeing any. They organize their lives around not going out during the afternoon because of their fear of witches, and their belief that they are prominent in the sky during the afternoon. A member of the tribe gets lost outside one afternoon; looking up at the sky a cloud appears to him as a witch. Does asymmetric dependence require the actual existence of the entity involved in the error? No, just as in the case of the centaur.

In his (2005) *Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology*, Burge claims that a closely associated thesis of perceptual anti-individualism is that, "a constitutively necessary condition on perceptual representation by an individual is that any such representation be associated with a background of some *veridical* perceptual representations" (2005: 1).¹² Burge holds that perceptual anti-individualism is a foundational part of vision science. His view allows us to see how the cloud-witch case does not pose a problem for asymmetric dependence. The core idea is that perceptual representation is only possible against the background of some *veridical* perceptual representations. It cannot be all non-veridical. The concept of a witch must include features about what a witch looks like. For

example, that it looks like a person, but has some different features, such that a cloud could appear as a witch to the person who has the concept of a witch. What is important is that the features that are part of the concept of a witch can code properties that are multiply realizable across a variety of things, such as clouds, where those things can trigger the perceptual system so that the witch concept is deployed rather than the cloud concept.

While Garfield's articulation of foundational illusionism is engaging, Nyāya's parasitism, Fodor's asymmetric dependence, and Burge's perceptual anti-individualism, all provide resources for resisting foundational illusionism. Garfield is correct to point out that perceptual experience has illusory content. Nevertheless, perceptual experience isn't always non-veridical, some of it tracks reality.

Interestingly, he says, "Nature does not track truth, but rather reproductive success" [chap. 10: 249]. This I find implausible: reproductive success depends on truth. A species cannot survive and reproduce without eating things that are actually food for them. That there might be some variation in what counts as "food" doesn't mean that nature never tracks truth. It just means that nature is not intolerant to narrow variations. But we cannot make sense of nature being tolerant of wide variations while saying that reproductive success is all that matters. Humans cannot survive on *chalk* even though it looks like *cassava* root. It is a mistake to contrast reproductive success with truth, unless one gives an account of what truth is, such that it can stand in stark opposition to reproductive success.¹³

3 ARGUMENT AGAINST PHENOMENAL REALISM SUCCUMBING TO THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN

Garfield (2017) holds that phenomenal illusionism does not succumb to the Myth of the Given. He argues that phenomenal realism does so succumb, and that this is a reason to endorse phenomenal illusionism.¹⁴ Garfield says:

The sphere of knowledge can only exist in the space of reasons; the space of reasons is constituted by publicly enforced norms of enquiry, assertion, and language use. And those norms require that the relevant objects of knowledge themselves be public. But the experience, posited by phenomenal realists, is private. It is hence not even a candidate for knowledge; nor are its putative objects candidate objects of knowledge. But once again, if it is unknowable, it is entirely idle. If we have phenomenal consciousness, we could never know it; whatever it is we confuse with phenomenal consciousness, if it is something of which we have knowledge, it is not phenomenal consciousness. (2017: 77)

And,

[T]he very bifurcation of experience into the subjective and the objective presupposed by the realist about phenomenal consciousness is illusory, and the entire framework in which we understand our inner experience is subject to massive illusion.

(2017: 82)

He further says:

There is something that a yellow mango is like. It is yellow, oblate, sweet, etc ... To say that it is like that is to ascribe to it perceptible properties ... [T]o say what something is like is to list its perceptible properties. [T]o the extent that experience has a subject-object structure, when we say what something is like, we characterize the objective, not the subjective, pole of experience.

(2017: 74)

And,

Nagel's sleight of hand ... is to convert *what the world is like for a bat* to *what it is like to be a bat*. That is to confuse the object with the subject, and to ask us to assign properties to our subjectivity, as opposed to the objects we experience ... When I have described the mango to you, I have said all I can ever say about my experience of it. If you ask me what it is like to be me, *simpliciter*, you ask me to describe consciousness itself, apart from any object of consciousness. There is no such thing. Consciousness is always consciousness *of* something, and when the object is subtracted, nothing remains to be characterized.

(2017: 74–5)

I must begin by acknowledging the importance of Garfield's critiques of phenomenal realism: They are unique and interesting. However, he thinks phenomenal realism succumbs to the Myth of the Given because he assumes that phenomenal realism must unfold into three separate theses, two of which, *N* and *E* below, lead the realist into the Myth of the Given. While some phenomenal realists might accept all them, I do not. The three claims are:

O: *Existence*, there are phenomenal qualities.

N: *Nature*, phenomenal qualities put us in direct/immediate contact with objects and qualities.¹⁵

E: *Knowability*, phenomenal qualities are introspectively accessible without the possibility of error.

Some phenomenal realists accept O, N, and E.¹⁶ I will argue that phenomenal realism need not succumb to the Myth of the Given by detaching N and E from O, thus:

Argument against Phenomenal Realism Being Committed to the Myth of the Given

1. Phenomenal realism is only committed to O, and *not* N or E.
2. O does not commit one to the Myth, since O is only an existence claim.
3. So, phenomenal realism does not succumb to the Myth of the Given.

I will first show why N is incoherent before moving on to an examination of E. At *Philosophical Investigations* 246, Wittgenstein says:

In what sense are my sensations *private*?—Well, only, I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “to know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.—Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself. It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I *know* I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I *am* in pain?

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations *only* from my behavior,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I *have* them.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain, but not to say it about myself.

Although it is controversial how best to interpret Wittgenstein here, the passage can be interpreted as suggesting that “knowledge” and “doubt” as they are ordinarily used in most contexts don’t really apply to an adult person who has mastered their use and is currently in pain. That is, Wittgenstein is pointing out that when a person has mastered the use of “pain” in their community, it will be absurd to think of ordinary cases where they would talk of knowing they are in pain when they are genuinely in pain. He is not talking about someone in a doctor’s office who has to state that they know they are in pain or in a philosophy class where they can talk of knowledge of pain (because language is on holiday). He is pointing to the ordinary absurdity of saying one knows one is in pain. Consequently, since knowledge and doubt are related, if knowledge doesn’t apply, neither does doubt.

Based on Wittgenstein’s comments about self-ascriptions of knowledge of pain being incoherent in the situation I have described, I will make the following analogical argument with respect to “direct,” “indirect,” “immediate,” and “mediate” being applied to the phenomenology of perception.

The Incoherence Argument

1. It doesn’t make sense to speak of knowledge where real doubt is not possible, such as in a case where one is in pain. To say, “I know that I am in pain,” when one is in the midst of it, is empty, since there is no possibility of doubt for the person in pain.
2. The case of knowledge of pain when one is in the midst of it is analogous to the case of the application of “direct” and “immediate” to experience in the case of phenomenal qualities, since there is no possibility of indirect contact or mediated experience *phenomenologically*.
3. So, it doesn’t make sense to speak of “direct” contact or “immediate” experience, when there is no possibility of “indirect” contact or “mediated” experience *phenomenologically*.

Moving off this argument I will construct an extended argument for the non-application of “direct,” “immediate,” “indirect,” and “mediate” to either the phenomenology of perception or to perceptual systems. The inspiration for this argument comes from Stephen Phillips’s (2020) introduction to Gaṅgeśa’s *Jewel of Reflection on the Truth About Epistemology*. Phillips informs us that the English “perception” and its Sanskrit equivalent “*pratyakṣa*” suffer from an ambiguity between the state that is the output of a process, and the process(es) that generate the state. These terms are ambiguous and need to be clarified before one can make a philosophical point about perception or *pratyakṣa*. His cross-linguistic observation allows for an extension of *the incoherence argument*, which I call *the no application argument*. Before I present this argument I need to clarify the common philosophical use of the terms “direct” and “indirect.”

In their most common philosophical use they are found within the philosophy of perception where there is a distinction between direct and indirect realism. Direct realism holds that there is no intermediary object in perception between the subject and the object. Indirect realism holds that there is such an intermediary object. Often enough the object is said to be a representation of the objects and qualities out in the world that through contact with a subject’s perceptual system leads to the construction of a representation. The no-application argument below aims to show that this use of “direct” and “indirect” is really a confusion because there are two distinct levels at which “perception” can be used. The personal

conscious level of experience where a subject sees something. The sub-personal nonconscious level where the perceptual system processes information that enables personal level conscious perception. On my view talk of representations is not something that is owned by indirect realists and incoherent in the realist framework. Rather, it is how one understands what work they do and at what level they are said to do that work.¹⁷

The No Application Argument

1. The distinction between direct and indirect realism about conscious perception is coherent only if both "direct" and "indirect" apply to the same domain with respect to perception.
2. The term "perception" is ambiguous between "perceptual state" and "the system of perceptual processing that produces a perceptual state."
3. A pair of contrast terms, such as "direct" *vs.* "indirect," apply in a domain only if both apply in the same domain.
4. The term "direct" cannot apply to a perceptual state because the term "indirect" has no application, since there is nothing that can be indirect conscious perception.
5. The term "indirect" cannot apply to a perceptual system because the term "direct" has no application, since perceptual processing always involves *processing*, whereby it is indirect in relation to the cause of the processing.
6. Therefore, the distinction between direct and indirect realism is confused. Perceptual states are not properly described as being "direct," and perceptual systems are not properly described as being "indirect, since the opposites do not apply"¹⁸ There is a confusion across levels at play.

With respect to the no application argument, (1) holds that we need a univocal reading of "direct" and "indirect" for them to be genuinely in conflict with one another.¹⁹ (2) follows from Phillips's cross-linguistic observation. (3) follows from the analogical argument based on Wittgenstein's comments on knowledge of pain. The heart of the no application argument is at (4) and (5).

Perceptual states have a phenomenology where objects and qualities are *presented*. It makes sense to talk of objects and qualities either being present or not in experience, because, for example, the rope is either present or absent in one's experience. As subjects of experience we present objects to ourselves by changing, for example, our visual field. However, it makes no sense to talk of experience being "direct" because there is no way for experience to be "indirect." In order to defend (4) let's consider two cases where one might think that one is having an indirect experience to show that the use of "indirect" has no application.

LSD creates light tracers. After about three hours on a sufficiently high dose of LSD, if one moves one's arms while watching them, they appear to have tracing lights following them. Are LSD-induced tracer experiences cases of indirect perceptual experience? No. These experiences are presentations of movement with light tracers. The presentation is different from a normal (non-LSD) experience of motion, but it doesn't shift from direct to indirect.

Another example: Mirror reflections allow us to see ourselves. We see ourselves by looking at a mirror, and often we can see the mirror as well. Are mirror reflection experiences cases of indirect perceptual experience? No. The presentation is different, but it doesn't shift from direct to indirect.²⁰

Perceptual systems cannot be said to be direct or indirect *simpliciter*. To defend (5) one need only recognize that those terms are qualifiers with respect to a system. While it makes no sense to talk of them in the *simpliciter* voicing, we can say *X* is direct for system *Z* because it lacks *Y* or *X* is indirect for system *Z* because it has *Y*. Under this triadic relation it makes sense to say something is indirect or direct because (i) we are talking at the same level, not crossing levels, such as when we talk about the direct (phenomenology) of perception *vs.* the indirect (processing) of a perceptual state as the output of a perceptual system, and (ii) we are revealing what is meant by those terms by saying what is present or absent that makes *X* either direct or indirect.

Simply put: From the perspective of phenomenology, experience just presents. It doesn't do so directly or indirectly. From the perspective of processing, experience is the output of a process. As a consequence, it cannot be immediate because there is always temporal delay and spatial distance. If it cannot be immediate, it cannot be mediate. There is no debate between the two terms at that level alone. Processing always involves application of something internal to a system to an input. Phenomenology always involves presentation.

So far the argument against *N* has shown that the terms "direct," "immediate," "indirect," and "mediate" have no coherent literal application to either the phenomenology of perception or to perceptual systems. However, because the Myth of the Given is formulated around the term "given," which Sellars singles out as problematic, we should ask: What is the status of it? At the processing level there is input into a system, but there is no sense in which the input is "given." Nobody is *giving* anything to the system. The system is in a position to have an input enabled through various causal factors obtaining, and our sensory system being designed to take input. At the phenomenological level it makes no sense to talk of something being "given" either. Literally nothing is "given" phenomenologically. Nothing feels "given" in perception, such that the term makes sense phenomenologically. Objects, qualities, scenes are *presented* in perception, not given. Sellars was right, we should drop "given."²¹

Thus, any argument for how phenomenal realism succumbs to the Myth that moves off *N*—the claim that there is something immediate, direct, or

given in experience—is mistaken. *N*-based arguments assume that the Myth of the Given applies to accounts of experience that utilize the terms “direct” and “indirect.” But if there is a Myth to worry about, it shouldn’t rest on the distinction between direct/immediate and indirect/mediate. Because, to borrow a phrase from Ryle, those distinctions applied either to perceptual states alone or systems alone is a *category mistake*. Perceptual systems neither have nor do not have directness or immediacy, and perceptual states are neither indirect or mediate. Those contrast terms don’t apply to the same use of “perception.” One of them may make sense at one level, direct for phenomenology and indirect for perceptual system. But really we should abandon them. Instead, we should recognize that the phenomenology of conscious experience is open to contrast terms, such as “presented,” “clear,” and “vivid” where their opposites, “not presented,” “unclear,” “blurry” also apply; and the classification of information processing systems is open to contrast terms, such as “simple,” “open,” and “digital” where their opposites, “complex,” “closed,” and “analog” also apply.

This takes us to *E*—the epistemic claim that something is known through introspection without the possibility of error. Could *E* be the source of how phenomenal realism succumbs to the Myth of the Given? As we saw in Section 2, Garfield thinks that we only ever encounter illusions of illusions when we look within. On my understanding (he doesn’t offer this version of the argument), the argument is the following.²²

1. Introspection is how we know our own minds.
2. All perceptual experiences have illusory content.
3. Introspection is just like perception.
4. So, all introspective experiences have illusory content.
5. To encounter our mind as it really is we would have to have no illusory content via introspection.
6. So, we only ever encounter illusions of illusions.

(1) needs clarification. Let us distinguish between mechanism and possession accounts of our knowledge of our own minds. Strawson (2015), for example, holds a *possession view*, since in having experience *e* one knows something, because *the having is the knowing*.²³ Garfield appears to be attacking *mechanism views*, which hold that having an experience isn’t sufficient for knowing until one applies a mechanism *m* that can be used to capture the character and content of one’s experience when one has *e*. Given that Garfield’s argument is directed at mechanism accounts, one ought to ask: are possession accounts immune from Garfield’s concern?

On Strawson’s possession account there is a primitive sense of “know”: When one has experience *e* thereby one knows something. Garfield should concede

that possession accounts are superior to mechanism accounts in avoiding a fatal version of the Myth of the Given—assuming that introspection gives immediate and incorrigible access without any illusory content because introspection accounts are mechanism accounts. After all in attacking introspection accounts he likely has in mind the view advocated by various Naiyāyikas.

But given that Garfield holds that we only ever encounter illusions of illusions, he will be troubled by possession accounts as well. For they hold that there is something that is incorrigible that we have in experience. This residual knowing, benign for Strawson, will lead Garfield to the criticism that even possession accounts succumb to the Myth of the Given.²⁴ So: does a phenomenal realist need to retain *E*?

They need not accept *E*, understood even as the more inclusive claim *E** that *either* phenomenal properties are introspectively incorrigibly accessible *or* that having an experience is a kind of knowing about one’s experience where one couldn’t be wrong. Borrowing from the work of Kevin Falvey²⁵ on self-knowledge, I will argue that a phenomenal realist can accept what is impossible to deny about self-knowledge with respect to phenomenal qualities, *privileged access*, while denying what, arguably, leads to the Myth of the Given, *sole authority* and *incorrigibility*. That is, if the Myth of the Given only applies to phenomenal realism when it makes an epistemological claim about knowing phenomenal qualities, as opposed to only an ontological claim about the existence of phenomenal qualities, one can block the application of the Myth of the Given by severing the link between the epistemological claim and the ontological claim.

Phenomenal realists must accept privileged access. A person *S* has privileged access to *p*, when they have a unique standpoint with respect to *p* that no one else could occupy. Privileged access does not entail sole authority. A person *S* has sole authority with respect to *p* when they are an authority on *p* and no one else could be. Sole authority does not entail incorrigibility. A person *S* has incorrigibility with respect to *p* when *S* couldn’t be wrong about *p*. So, privileged access does not entail incorrigibility. Does this argument hold?

Phenomenal realists can deny sole authority. Others can know the bodily signs which constitute some of our conscious states, and are reliable indicators of them. That is why some poker players can identify the *tell* of another when they are bluffing. If there were no relation between a *tell* and bluffing, poker games, and the term “poker face,” would be pointless.

Phenomenal realists can deny incorrigibility. Often there are complex multi-sensory experiences, such as when itches-tickles-and-pains are mixed: It is impossible to identify each moment as being only itch, tickle, or pain when they happen in fast succession. When we philosophically think of a case of pain isolated from the context in which it occurs we think we couldn’t be wrong about it. But actual pains occur in contexts that can be confusing to the subject.

Young children often have pain-inducing experiences, falling down, yet don't have pain expressions. Are they really in pain?

Thus, while phenomenal realists must accept *O*—that phenomenal qualities really exist—they can deny *N*—that they are direct and immediate—and *E*—that they are incorrigibly known. By denying *N* and *E*, phenomenal realism, like phenomenal illusionism, avoids the Myth of the Given. Whether endorsement of *O* independently of *N* and *E* is as attractive a position as the *ONE* conception is another issue. The basic point is that phenomenal realism need not be rejected in virtue of it succumbing to the Myth of the Given. Nevertheless, I concede that Garfield might be correct. This version of phenomenal realism might simply be uninteresting because of the separation between ontology and epistemology.²⁶

4 ARGUMENT AGAINST THE SUBJECT-OBJECT DICHOTOMY BEING AN ILLUSION

When Garfield criticizes Nagel's articulation of the notion of *what it is like* in relation to phenomenal consciousness, and says, "[c]onsciousness is always consciousness of something, and when the object is subtracted, nothing remains to be characterized (2017: 74–5)," he recognizes that ordinary conscious states, such as perceiving a yellow lemon on a table, have two properties: (i) the generic property of *being dual with respect to the existence of a subject pole and an object pole*, and (ii) object dependence.

In accepting that there is a subject-object dichotomy in ordinary conscious experience, Garfield is, at minimum, from my point of view, acknowledging the intentionality of ordinary conscious experience as articulated in Brentano's (1874) *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*.

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by ... what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself.

(Brentano 1874/1973: 68)

While Garfield accepts that the intentionality of conscious experience displays a subject-object duality, he also holds that this is an illusion.²⁷ However, the evidence as to why it is an illusion is conclusive relative to some traditions of philosophy, but inconclusive relative to testimony. There is an intermediary position about the nature of consciousness superior to the view that the subject-object dichotomy is an illusion. Here my argument focuses on testimonial evidence from mystics or subjects that testify to the existence of non-dual consciousness—consciousness where the subject-object dichotomy collapses.²⁸

Argument against Subject-Object Dichotomy Being an Illusion

1. Most people's conscious experiences have a subject-object duality to them because they are states of intentional consciousness.
2. Some people report having conscious experiences where the subject-object duality collapses and there is no intentionality.
3. Although, for many of us what is reported by mystics is not something we understand based on our own experience, the testimony of mystics provides evidence of conscious experiences without a subject-object dichotomy.
4. Therefore, conscious experience has subject-object duality as a contingent feature. It is essential to *intentional* consciousness, but not to *pure* consciousness.

One way to understand this argument is to apply it to Śāṅkara's Advaitin metaphysics: it is because all that is real is pure non-dual consciousness that the subject-object duality is an illusion from the perspective of fundamental reality. If all that is real from the perspective of fundamental reality is pure non-dual consciousness, then it follows that there are three illusions: (i) the subject of experience, qua being an individual subject; (ii) the object of experience, qua what is presented to a subject of experience; and (iii) the subject-object duality under which a subject of experience takes an object to be something external, independent, and non-identical to herself.²⁹ This position is not the only analysis available. The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental need not track that between real and illusory. It doesn't follow from the fact that non-fundamental things are *not fundamental* that they are illusory or unreal. For example, while Śāṅkara held that non-fundamental reality, non-dual pure consciousness, is real and everything else is an illusion from that perspective, one of his critics, Rāmānuja, held that both fundamental and non-fundamental reality are real.³⁰

The subject-object duality is a contingent feature of the type *conscious experience*. The duality is absent in *pure* consciousness but present in *intentional* consciousness. Therefore, the duality is only a contingent feature of consciousness *simpliciter*. To argue that it is contingent and illusory or contingent because illusory, one must go further.

If the duality is an illusion like the rope-snake illusion, then one must answer a subject question and an object question. The *subject question*: who has the illusion of the dichotomy? Since in the case of the rope-snake illusion there is someone who has the illusion. The *object question*: what is the thing that is presented otherwise as having the duality when in fact it doesn't? Since in the rope-snake illusion there is a rope that is presented otherwise as a snake.

Śāṅkara would say that it is pure non-dual consciousness which is the answer to both questions. It is pure non-dual consciousness which is the subject of the subject-object illusion, because the self is illusory, qua being an individual self;

and it is pure non-dual consciousness that is perceived otherwise as having the subject-object duality by an illusory self. If the Buddhist illusionism that Garfield endorses offers the same response that Śāṅkara does, I find the answer unsatisfying.

Garfield holds that in all cases of conscious experience the subject-object duality is an illusion.³¹ He is also a phenomenal illusionist who denies that there are qualitative, *what it is like* properties in conscious experience.³² Thus, Garfield's account endorses the following inference.

1. The subject-object dichotomy is an illusory aspect of conscious experience.
2. So, qualitative properties present in conscious experience are illusory as well.

However, this inference looks problematic. It is possible that qualitative properties are real, but how they structurally show up for us is an illusion, as straight oars show up for us as bent when submerged in water.³³

5 CONCLUSION: RESISTING ILLUSIONISM

Garfield argues for three kinds of illusionism: foundational illusionism—illusions all the way down; phenomenal illusionism—qualities are illusory; structural illusionism—the subject-object dichotomy is illusory. Although I find Buddhist illusionism, and Garfield's articulation of it, important because it offers an account of our primal confusion and how we can ease our suffering, I have, nevertheless, argued that these three kinds of illusionism can be interrogated. I concede that my arguments are not conclusive or demonstrative of the falsity of the kinds of illusionism that Garfield presents and defends. And I concede to Garfield that I have not engaged his accuracy illusion because I find that the real question is "how much of our experience is an illusion?" And not: does our experience suffer from an accuracy problem? Both the none and all positions to the "how much" question are clearly false for me, since there is always the incompleteness illusion and we do track some features of an objective world for which we do acquire reliable concepts. What is important to me is discovering different kinds of illusions in our experience and isolating what is not an illusion, on a gradient view of our relation to reality.

Garfield characterizes the *fundamental illusion* that is problematic thus:

The fundamental cognitive illusion is to take our mental states to exist intrinsically rather than conventionally, and for our knowledge of them to be immediate, independent of conventions. This illusion is pervasive, instinctive, and profoundly self-alienating, obscuring the deeply conventional

character of our own existence and self-knowledge. And this illusion is what, according to Buddhist philosophers, lies at the root of our grasping and aversion, *and hence of the pervasive suffering of existence.*

([chap. 10: 253], *emphasis added*)

I hope I have shown how this characterization can be interrogated. For example, our knowledge of our mental states could not be immediate, there is temporal delay. The illusion is not instinctive, and not necessarily self-alienating. In conclusion it is worth pointing out that Garfield's endorsement of phenomenal illusionism leads to a potential problem for the Buddhist project of helping us overcome our suffering. Garfield argues.

1. Suffering exists.
2. The root cause of suffering is confusion about the fundamental nature of reality.
3. Confusion is to be analyzed in terms of specific illusions, such as the illusion of a self and subject-object duality in perceptual experience.
4. Only by overcoming these illusions can suffering be extinguished.
5. So, to overcome suffering we must overcome these illusions.

The fourth noble truth of Buddhism states that there is a path to overcoming suffering: The eight-fold path. One step on this path is having the *right view*. If the right view required sustained ontological and epistemological understanding, philosophizing would be a necessary condition for overcoming suffering. I don't think that having the right view requires ontological and epistemological understanding, which has been debated throughout Buddhist philosophy across Abhidharma, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka.³⁴ If it did, it would appear to put high cognitive demands on us all. Rather, the right view might only require that one *jointly understands that there is no permanent self across all times and that all things are dependently originated* so as to help one engage in practices that ease suffering, such as meditation. Given the complexity involved in settling how Buddhist ontology relates to its soteriology, I set aside the issue of whether the arguments I have offered undermine Buddhist soteriology. I don't think they do.

While there are intriguing arguments in favor of Garfield's position, there is also a tension in Garfield's phenomenal illusionism and the Buddhist path to overcoming suffering. Consider an argument offered by the phenomenal realist, David Chalmers (2018: 53), in his critique of phenomenal illusionism.

1. People sometimes feel pain.
2. If strong illusionism is true, then no one feels pain.
3. So, strong illusionism is false.

The Buddha aims to give us a way to ease our suffering (*dukkha*). The least controversial kind of suffering is phenomenal pain. While one might deny that existential angst causes suffering, no one really denies that phenomenal pain causes suffering. The connection between phenomenal pain and suffering is stronger, almost analytic with respect to the concepts, than what we find when we think about other causes of suffering. If strong illusionism makes it the case that no one feels pain, since pain is an illusion, then a major project within Buddhism becomes incoherent.

NOTES

- 1 See Frankish (2017) for an articulation and defense of phenomenal illusionism in Anglo-analytic philosophy of mind. Garfield (2017) discusses phenomenal illusionism in relation to Buddhist philosophy of mind.
- 2 I thank Jay Garfield for pointing out this fourth illusion and its centrality to his engagement with Buddhism. One core way he articulates this is as follows: "Perception irresistibly *feels* like it presents the world to us as it is, independent of the peculiarities of our perceptual system and the conceptual resources that filter perception. In the same way, apperception *feels* like it presents our own cognitive, affective, and perceptual states to us just as they are, independent of the structure of our apperceptive system and of the conceptual categories in terms of which we understand our own inner states" [chap. 10: 249]. However, neither perception nor apperception feels like they present *the world to us as it is*. Rather, they feel as if they present something to us irresistibly. Whether that be the world as it is, is, altogether, not part of what is irresistibly presented. That is an afterthought, a highly processed, intellectual one.
- 3 All types of illusionism discussed here are to be distinguished from Alva Noe's (2002) view that *the world is a grand illusion*, where visual experience is held to be far less stable and detailed than we suppose it to be.
- 4 See Wittgenstein (2001: 25).
- 5 It is important to note two things. First, the totality of perceptions cannot provide a way to refute the argument because no individual has the totality of perceptions at one time nor does the collection of all people at all times provide a way in which the world as a complete fact is seen. Second, one should not take this argument to be about seeing something completely *vs.* seeing the world as complete. For example, one might argue that even though we see an apple from a given perspective what we see is the apple *as complete*. The notion of complete here is different than the one used in the argument above. When we say we see the apple completely we mean not as a fragmented object, for example, an apple with a bite in it. However, we still don't see the apple completely, parts are excluded. More importantly, though, we simply never see the world as Wittgenstein describes it.
- 6 *Verse 3*: The production of appearances at particular times and places is established, just as in the case of dreams. "In dreams, even without the presence of any external object, certain objects like flies, gardens, women, men, etc., are

seen, only at certain places [within those dreams] and not everywhere. Even when a particular place is fixed, they are seen only at certain times [during those dreams], and not always. Hence, even without the presence of any external object, appearances may arise only at particular times" (Das 2018: 431).

- 7 *Verse 4*: The causal efficacy of objects of appearances is established just as in the case of nocturnal emissions. "The analogy is that even though there is no sexual intercourse in a dream, the dreamer still discharges semen."
- 8 In making this argument Vasubandhu is responding to the objection that if there were no external causes, then appearances could occur at any place at any time. He argues that it doesn't follow from the fact that something just is an appearance that it can occur at any place at any time.
- 9 The claim that we "see illusions of illusions" is hard to understand. On my view, it would appear that the occurrence of "see" is an instance where there is no illusion in play. Thanks to Strawson for pointing out that this occurrence should be examined.
- 10 Note the "it" in "paint it." It would seem then that there is something external which is painted.
- 11 See Dasti (2012: 6) for this reconstruction.
- 12 Anti-individualism is a general thesis advocated by Tyler Burge. The basic idea, applied here to the case of perception, is that what seems to be internal to an agent is actually determined by factors that depend on the agent's environment.
- 13 At footnote 14, Garfield aims to rebut my argument here by pointing to an argument in *Painted Rice Cakes*. He points out that the argument from asymmetric dependence is irrelevant, since the real point is about ontological independence, not asymmetric dependence. He says, "[E]verything we experience is experienced *as existing independently* when it does not do so. To respond to that would require showing that this obviously erroneous aspect of our experience is sometimes absent" [chap. 10: 262]. I have no understanding of why anyone would say that everything we experience is experienced as existing independently when it is not obviously so. Most, if not all, things we experience we experience as existing dependently. I experience the computer and table before me as dependently existing on my engagement with them. I believe they exist without me, but I don't experience them that way. Most things I experience, I experience in relation to myself in a dependent way. I experience them as not connected to me, but that doesn't mean that I experience them as being independent of me. I have beliefs about their existence independently of me, but I don't experience them that way unless I take my beliefs into my experience and conceptualize my experience that way. I think Garfield is describing our experience as if we all have experience the way he characterizes it, instead of thinking of how people might describe their experience differently. I take it that many would agree with him, but I doubt his words capture how everyone would at all times describe their experience. To say that we experience things either independently or dependently is highly intellectualized.
- 14 Garfield (2017: 82) says, "The Indian Yogācāra Buddhist analysis presents yet another perspective on why this kind of phenomenal realism represents yet another form of the Myth of the Given, and on why that Myth is indeed a Myth. The Myth of the Given is the Myth that there is some level of our experience

that is immediate, immune from error, given to us, as opposed to constructed, and that the level of experience constitutes the foundation or transcendental condition of the possibility of, knowledge of anything else ... The idea that there is an immediate level of phenomenal consciousness, a primitive sense of subjectivity, a way our inner life is, independent of how we might imagine it, is only the latest version of that Myth. But the very idea that anything in our conscious life is immune from illusion, that there is anything that it is like to be a subject, *per se*, that there are inner experiences that we just have and in virtue of just having them we know immediately, is itself but one more cognitive illusion." And in this volume [250] he says, "We are seduced by the idea that, even if in the end we know the world only through perceptual and conceptual mediation, it can't be mediation all the way down: There must be a basic level of experience to which we have immediate access, that we know veridically. But while this myth is powerful, both psychologically and philosophically, it is, as Sellars showed, a myth. And only by coming to understand the myth can we exorcise the philosophical demons it allows to possess us. As we will see in what follows, Buddhist philosophy of mind and epistemology offers a powerful tool for undermining the Myth of the Given."

- 15 Garfield points out that *N* should be stated as follows: Inner experience puts us in direct/immediate contact with phenomenal qualities. *I don't agree, but I do see that if we put things his way, his argument is much stronger.* His way of putting things assumes that there is a distinction between inner and outer experience. I don't think there is such a distinction. There is experience, and there is what it is of. Of course Kant discussed experience of the inner as temporally regulated, and experience of the outer as spatially regulated. But that is not the distinction of "inner experience" that Garfield appears to be pointing to. Garfield also says, "Our inner states present themselves to our awareness as though they are just given to us [chap. 10: 249]." This is a hyper-intellectualized claim. There is no other way for inner states to present themselves to our awareness. What would it be like for our inner states to be presented in a non-given way or constructed way? Were we to see the construction as it unfolded we would only be seeing the process as given.
- 16 Strawson (2006, 2015) appears to be one phenomenal realist who might succumb to Garfield's critique, since he does hold versions of *N* and *E*. With respect to *E*, Strawson denies the relevance of *introspection* to knowing one's own mind, which Garfield attacks, but Strawson accepts knowability when he says, "[T]o have experience is already to know what it is, however little one reflects about it. There is, to repeat, a fundamental respect in which *the having is the knowing*. This is because the knowing is just—just is—the having (it involves no 'introspection'). The having is all there is to the knowing, in this fundamental sense of 'know'; it's (non-discursive) knowledge 'by acquaintance'" (2015: 219).
- 17 My own view is influenced by Strawson's (2015) "Real Direct Realism." However, it is different from his.
- 18 My argument here is not only about Garfield's use of "direct" and "indirect," but of the whole literature within Western, and if Garfield is correct, Indian, philosophy that uses the distinction.
- 19 Strawson (2015: 244) holds that, direct realists can acknowledge three central existents: The subject of experience *S*, the experience/representation *E/R*, and the object *O*. He argues that indirect realism is correct to insist on *E*, but wrong when

it proposes that *E* stands between *S* and *O*. Rather, *S* has *E*, and *S*'s having *E* is *S*'s perceiving *O*. *E* is necessary, and given appropriate causation, sufficient for *S*'s consciously perceiving *O*. Strawson holds that according to direct realism, "one doesn't perceive objects, one *ceives* objects ('ceives' derives from '*capere*', to take hold of)." While I agree with Strawson's account of direct and indirect realism, I find that the terms "direct" and "indirect" are the source of a levels confusion.

- 20 It should be clarified here that we are discussing the phenomenology of the experience, not the causation or the epistemology of the experience. But simply *what it is like* to have the experience. Clearly the causation is indirect, since a mirror is involved. And depending on how one thinks about the epistemology, it can be argued to be indirect. The phenomenology, however, is neither direct nor indirect.
- 21 See the opening lines of Sellars's *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (1963: 127). He says that one can reject the notion of "the given" without flying in the face of reason. Strawson, however, argues that there is a sense in which we can use the term "given." He says, "[W]hat is given in perceptual experience is not just *cow-under-a-tree-in-a-field*: in the normal case...perceptual experience is in effect also assertion, or at least affirmation" (u.p.s.: 9). And, "I have endorsed a use of 'the given' that allows us to say that the given, in a particular case of veridical visual experience, is *a cow under a tree in a field*. In so doing I've gone beyond the ... use according to which what is given, in such a case, is identical to what could be given in imagination or hallucination: *cow-under-a-tree-in-a-field-ishness*, or *there-is-a-cow-under-a-tree-in-a-field*, but not *a cow under a tree in a field*—i.e. not an actual cow under an actual tree in an actual field" (u.p.s.: 15). While the sense he articulates is reasonable and acceptable, the term "the given" should be jettisoned in favor of "presented" where we can qualify the term through the process, such as *presented through imagination* or *presented through perception*. Hallucinations have presentational content, but their presentation is not through properly functioning perception. Rather, they are cases of presentation through projection.
- 22 Garfield [chap. 10: 254] says, "[P]erception does not deliver independently existing objects through our senses to our subjectivity; those objects do not exist outside of us with the same properties that appear as photocopies in inner representations. That is to say that we as subjects are not outside of the world of our experience. All of these aspects of our experience—the independence of our perceptual objects, subject-object duality, and immediate awareness of inner representations—are illusory; all are superimpositions." Conjoin this with the following statement [chap. 10: 259–60], "[I]f we thought that the moral of Buddhist illusionism was that we only encounter *experiences* instead of real objects, we are wrong: it is that we don't even encounter real experiences, only illusions of experiences. And if we thought, with a bit more sophistication that our encounter with those illusions was even an encounter with *actual illusions*, we are wrong, there, too, we only see illusions of illusions." And [chap. 10: 252], "[R]ecall Indian epistemologists and philosophers of mind, including Buddhist philosophers, identify a sixth-sense faculty, the *manas-vijñāna*, or introspective sense faculty, by means of which we know our occurrent cognitive, affective, and perceptual states. And that introspective sense is also a measuring instrument, a *pramāṇa*, and is delivering us a report on the contents of our mind. This means

that our access to our own inner states is also mediated by an instrument that delivers us only indirect information about our inner life, and whose internal workings we do not fully understand. As a consequence, even our sense that we know our own cognitive states directly and accurately is an instance of cognitive illusion. Instead, our knowledge of the inner domain, like that of the outer, is mediated and delivers us not information about what they are, but about how they appear to us given our particular cognitive architecture.”

- 23 Section 246 from Wittgenstein's *Investigations* might also signal a possession account: “Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations *only* from my behavior, –for I cannot be said to learn of them. I *have* them.”
- 24 See Garfield (2017: 82): “But the very idea that anything in our conscious life is immune from illusion, that there is anything that it is like to be a subject, *per se*, that there are inner experiences that we just have and in virtue of just having them we know immediately, is itself but one more cognitive illusion.”
- 25 The argument here is based on conversations with Falvey. It is not a direct record of what he is arguing. See (2000a, 2000b) for further insight.
- 26 At endnote 14, Garfield rebuts my argument by saying that one cannot really detach *O* from *E* because, “The very point of postulating them [phenomenal properties] (in contrast to the distal properties with which they are meant to put us in contact) is that they are the properties of which we are *immediately* (and so incorrigibly) aware and which *mediate* (fallibly) our access to the external world. Drop that, and you simply have properties of which we happen to be aware, and which are no different in kind from external properties. [chap. 10: 262]” The point of Garfield's response is that I am arguing for a position that has no real use. His response is relevant and important. Let me briefly note that there are two notions of immediacy, temporal and spatial. Nothing is presented in the temporally immediate sense. Everything has a processing time. Nothing is presented in the spatial sense of immediacy, since there is distance between distal properties and our cognitive and sensory apparatus. So, I just reject immediacy. Furthermore, nothing feels immediate. If incorrigibility is tied to immediacy, and there is no immediacy, then there is no incorrigibility. The point of positing phenomenal properties is that our experience can be phenomenally characterized and phenomenal properties are the referents of phenomenal characterizations. Whether or not the properties referred to by phenomenal characterizations are to be found at the fundamental level of characterizing the world is a further issue of central debate between illusionists and panpsychists.
- 27 Garfield (2017: 82) says, “[T]he very bifurcation of experience into the subjective and the objective presupposed by the realist about phenomenal consciousness is illusory, and the entire framework in which we understand our inner experience is subject to massive illusion.”
- 28 See Maharaj (2018) for a discussion of the epistemology of mystical experience with respect to the collapse of the subject-object dichotomy. My argument builds on his work, but is distinct from it.
- 29 See Forsthoefel (2018) for a review of Śāṅkara. My understanding is derived from lectures by V.N. Jha on the Tattvabodha.
- 30 See Barua (2010) on Rāmānuja.
- 31 See Garfield (2017: 82).
- 32 See Garfield (2017: 73–5).

- 33 At footnote 14, Garfield rebuts my argument against structural illusionism. He says, “[T]he argument against structural illusionism, that is against the claim that subject-object duality is illusory, in fact concedes that that duality is a superimposition. But that is to concede the point, *viz.*, that something that presents itself as a primordial aspect of experience is indeed constructed” [chap. 10: 262–3]. I think Garfield is right to think that my argument is odd here and supports his position. It can be read that way. But he misunderstands the position and fails to consider a potential fallacy in his own reasoning. The point is that there are two types: dual and non-dual consciousness. One is about intentionality (dual) the other about pure phenomenality (non-dual). To hold that the dual version is illusory, one needs to show that the other is the fundamental, and that the dual presents as a “primordial aspect of experience,” when in fact it is non-dual that is fundamental. But dual consciousness doesn't present itself as primordial. What it does, for most of us, is present itself as how things show up. For mystics, it is different. We assume that because things happen this way for us, they happen to all of us this way all of the time. And, thus, we might be skeptical of mystics because we don't share their experience. My argument, however, aims to show that there are two types of consciousness, on a par with Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness, but instead focused on structure: dual vs. non-dual. The two kinds, be they constructed or deconstructed, are simply two distinct kinds. Rather than accepting the view, common in some schools of Indian philosophy, that non-dual consciousness is the nature of fundamental reality and that dual consciousness is an illusion, the two kinds view holds that there are just two distinct kinds of consciousness that serve different roles. Since intentionality is such a prevalent part of animal cognition, dual consciousness shows up as pervasive in animal experience.
- 34 Of course, and very likely, I am a deeply mistaken neophyte. In Vasubandhu's *Twenty Verses* at *verse* 8 he considers the following objection: If consciousness arises through the senses in response to objects external to the senses, how can reality be consciousness-only? He responds: The teaching of the Buddha was only for neophytes. In other words, it is an exoteric (publicly presented) teaching, but has an esoteric (hidden or secret) meaning. See Anacker (1998: 169).

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