CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCING INDIAN LOGIC

1.1 "Logic" in What Sense?

"Logic" I shall here understand to be the systematic study of informal inference-patterns, the rules of debate, the identification of sound inference vis-à-vis sophistical argument, and similar topics. One may feel somewhat apologetic today to use the term "logic" in the context of classical Indian philosophy, for "logic" has acquired a very specific connotation in modern philosophical parlance. Nevertheless, the list supplied in the opening sentence is, I believe, a legitimate usage of the term, especially when its older senses are taken into account. S.C. Vidyabhusana's monumental, but by now dated, work A History of Indian Logic (1921), has misled many non-Sanskritists. For both he, and scholars such as H. N. Randle and T. Stcherbatsky, used such terms as "Indian logic" and "Buddhist logic" when their intention was to write about the theory of pramāṇas or accredited means of knowing in general, perhaps with particular emphasis upon the specific theory of anumāna, inference considered as means of knowing. I have chosen not to follow the same path; instead, I shall take "logic" in its extended and older sense in order to carve out a way for my own investigation. I shall use the traditional śāstras and try to explain their significance and relevance to our modern discussion of the area sometimes called "philosophical logic." I shall include much else besides, as the initial list shows, but will try to remain faithful to the topic of logic, debate, and the study of inference. I. M. Bochenski included a separate, albeit sketchy chapter called "The Indian Variety of Logic," in his great work A History of Formal Logic (1956). This will, perhaps, be enough to justify my use of the term "logic" when I am trying to cover similar ground.
Logic as the study of the form of correct arguments and inference-patterns, developed in India from the methodology of philosophical debate. The art of conducting a philosophical debate was prevalent probably as early as the time of the Buddha and the Mahāvīra (Jina), but it became more systematic and methodical a few hundred years later. By the second century BC, the intellectual climate in India was bristling with controversy and criticism. At the center of controversy were certain dominant religious and ethical issues. Nothing was too sacred for criticism. Such questions as: "Is there a soul different from body?", "Is the world (loka) eternal?", "What is the meaning, goal, or purpose of life?", and, "Is renunciation preferable to enjoyment?", were of major concern. While teachers and thinkers argued about such matters, there arose a gradual awareness of the characteristics or patterns of correct—that is, acceptable and sound—reasoning, and concern about how it differs from the kind of reasoning that is unacceptable.

1.2 AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF LOGICAL ISSUES IN INDIA: DEBATE AND LOGIC

Logic developed in ancient India from the tradition of vādavidyā, a discipline dealing with the categories of debate over various religious, philosophical, moral, and doctrinal issues. There were several vāda manuals available around the beginning of the Christian era. They were meant for students who wanted to learn how to conduct debates successfully, what tricks to learn, how to find loopholes in the opponent's position, and what pitfalls to be wary of. We will examine some of these manuals in chapters 2 and 3. Of these manuals, the one found in the Nyāyasūtras of Aksapāda Gautama (circa 150 AD) is comparatively more systematic than others. We shall hence follow it in this introductory exposition.

Debates, in Aksapāda's view, can be of three types: (i) an honest debate (called vāda) where both sides, proponent and opponent, are seeking the truth, that is, wanting to establish the right view; (ii) a tricky-debate (called jalpa) where the goal is to win by fair means or foul; and (iii) a destructive debate (called vitandā) where the goal is to defeat or demolish the opponent, no matter how. This almost corresponds to the cliché in English: the good, the bad and the ugly. The first kind signals the employment of logical arguments, and use of rational means and proper evidence to establish a thesis. It is said that the participants in this kind of debate were the teacher and the student, or the students themselves, belonging to the same school.

The second was, in fact, a winner-takes-all situation. The name of the game was wit or intelligence. Tricks, false moves, and unfair means were allowed according to the rules of the game. But if both the debaters were equally clever and competent, this could be kept within the bounds of logic and reasoning. Usually two teachers of different schools would be participants. This used to take place before a board or jury called the madhyastha (the mediators or adjudicators) and a chairman, usually a king or a man with power and money who would organize the debate. The winner would be declared at the end by the consensus of the adjudicators.

The third type was a variety of the second type, where the winner was not supposed to establish his own position (he may not even have had a position) but only to defeat the opponent using logical arguments, or as the case was, tricks or clever devices. It was explicitly destructive and negative; hence philosophers like Vātsyāyana (circa 350 AD) denounced this form of debate in unambiguous language. Again, a clever and competent opponent might force the other side into admitting a counter-position ("If you deny my thesis p, then you must admit the thesis not-p; therefore, please establish your thesis"), and if the other side yielded, the debate was decided in favor of the former, or it would turn into the second form of debate.

The notoriety of the third type was universal, although some philosophers (for example, Nāgārjuna, Śrīharṣa) maintained that if the refutations of the opponent were done on the basis of good reason and evidence (in other words, if it followed the model of the first type, rather than the second type) then lack of a counter-thesis, or non-establishment of a counter-thesis, would not be a great drawback. In fact, it could be made acceptable and even philosophically respectable. That is why Gauḍa Sānātana (quoted by Udayana; see Matilal, 1986: 87) divided the debates into four types: (i) the honest type (vāda), (ii) the tricky type (jalpa), (iii) the type modeled after the tricky type but for which only refutation is needed, and (iv) the type modeled after the honest one where only the refutation of a thesis is needed. Even the mystics would prefer this last kind, which would end with a negative result. The different types of debate, and the philosophical significance of the 'refutation-only' type, are discussed in depth in chapter 2.

Apart from developing a theory of evidence (pramāṇa) and argument (tarka) needed for the first type of debate, the manuals go on to list a number of cases, or situation-types, where the debate will be concluded and one side will be declared as "defeated" (or nigraha-ssthāna, the defeat situation or the clinchers). The Nyāyasūtra lists 22 of them. For example, (a) if the opponent cannot understand the proponent's argument, or (b) if he is confused, or (c) if he cannot reply within a reasonable time limit—all these will be cases of defeat. Besides, these manuals identify seven standard "false" rejoinders or jāti (24 of them are listed in the Nyāyasūtra), as well as some underhand tricks (chala) like equivocation and confusion of a metaphor for the literal. These "tricks," "false rejoinders," and "defeat situations" are examined in
detail in chapter 3. Now we may survey the type of logical theorizing that arose out of the study of debate in India.

*The Nyāya Model*

Ākṣapāda defined a method of philosophical argumentation, called the nyāya method or the nyāya model. This was the standard for an ideally-organized philosophical disputation. Seven categories are identified as constituting the “prior” stage of a nyāya. A nyāya starts with an initial doubt, as to whether p or not-p is the case, and ends with a decision, that p (or not-p, as the case may be). The seven categories, including Doubt, are: Purpose, Example, Basic Tenets, the “limbs” of the formulated reasoning, Supportive Argument (*tarka*), and Decision. Purpose is self-explanatory. The example is needed to ensure that the arguments would not be just empty talk. Some of the basic tenets supply the ground rules for the argumentation.

The “limbs” were the most important formulation of the structure of a logical reasoning; these are a landmark in the history of Indian logic. According to the Nyāyasūtras, there are five “limbs” or “steps” in a structured reasoning. They should all be articulated linguistically. The first step is the statement of the thesis, the second the statement of reason or evidence, the third citation of an example (a particular case, well-recognized and acceptable to both sides) that illustrates the underlying (general) principle and thereby supports the reason or evidence. The fourth is the showing of the present thesis as a case that belongs to the general case, for reason or evidence is essentially similar to the example cited. The fifth is the assertion of the thesis again as proven or established. Here is the time-honored illustration:

Step 1. There is fire on the hill.
Step 2. For there is smoke.
Step 3. (Wherever there is smoke, there is fire), as in the kitchen.
Step 4. This is such a case (smoke on the hill).
Step 5. Therefore it is so, i.e., there is fire on the hill.

The Buddhists and others argued that this was too elaborate for capturing the essential structure. All we need would be the first two or the first three. The rest would be redundant. But the Nyāya school asserted all along that this nyāya method is used by the arguer to convince others, and to satisfy completely the “expectation” (ākāṃkṣā) of another, you need all the five “limbs” or steps. This is in fact a full-fledged articulation of an inference schema.

Returning to the nyāya method itself, the supportive argument (*tarka*) is needed when doubts are raised about the implication of the middle part of the above inference schema. Is the example right? Does it support the evidence? Is the general principle right? Is it adequate? The “supportive arguments” would examine the alternative possibilities, and try to resolve all these questions. After the supportive argument comes the decision, one way or another.

Another seven categories were identified as constituting the “posterior stage” of the nyāya method. They consist of three types of debate (already mentioned), the group of tricks, false rejoinders, and clinchers or defeat situations, and another important logical category, that of pseudo-reason or pseudo-evidence.

Pseudo-evidence is similar to evidence or reason, but it lacks adequacy or the logical force to prove the thesis added. It is in fact an “impostor.” The Nyāyasūtra notes five such varieties. Although these five varieties were mentioned throughout the history of the Nyāya tradition (with occasional disagreement, for example, Bhāsarvajña, who had six), they were constantly redefined to fit the developing logical theories of individual authors. The five types of pseudo-evidence were: the deviating, the contradictory, the unestablished or unproven, the counter-balanced, and the untimely.

Since there can be fire without smoke (as in a red-hot iron ring), if somebody wants to infer presence of smoke in the kitchen on the basis of the presence of fire there, his evidence would be pseudo-evidence called the “deviating.” Where the evidence (say a pool of water) is usually the sign for the absence of fire, rather than its presence, it is called the contradictory. An evidence-reason must itself be established or proven to exist, if it has to establish something else. Hence, an “unestablished” evidence-reason is a pseudo-evidence or a pseudo-sign. A purported evidence-reason may be countered by a purported counter-evidence showing the opposite possibility. This will be a case of the “counter-balanced.” An “untimely” is one where the thesis itself precludes the possibility of adding some sign as being the evidence-reason by virtue of its incompatibility with the thesis in question. The “untimely” is so-called because as soon as the thesis is stated, the evidence will no longer be an evidence. (For further elaboration, see Matilal, 1985, §1.5).

*The Sign and the Signified*

All this implicitly spells out a theory of what constitutes an adequate sign. What we have been calling “evidence,” “reason,” and sometimes “evidence-reason” may just be taken to be an adequate or “logical” sign. The Sanskrit word for it is liṅga, a sign or a mark, and what it is a sign for is called liṅgaṇa, the signified, the “marked” entity. This is finally tied to their theory of sound inference, that is, inference of the signified from the observation of the logical
The third condition is easily explained. The sign must not be present where the signified is not present. For otherwise, as we have already noted, the sign will be *deviating*, and would be a "pseudo-sign." Why the second condition? Did Dīṇāga overshoot his mark? Is not the second condition redundant (for the first and the third seem to be sufficient to guarantee adequacy)? These questions were raised in the tradition by both the Naiyāyikas like Uddyotakara (circa 550–625 AD), and the Buddhists like Dharmakīrti (circa 600–660 AD). Some, such as Dharmakīrti, maintained that it was slightly repetitious but not exactly redundant. The second condition states positively what the third, for the sake of emphasis, states negatively. The second is here rephrased as: the sign should be present in all *sapakṣas*. The contrapositive version can then be formulated with a little ingenuity as: the sign should be absent from all *vipakṣas*. For *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, along with the *paksas*, exhaust the universe of discourse.

Other interpreters try to find additional justification for the second condition to argue against the "redundancy" charge. The interpretation becomes complicated, and we will postpone going into the details until chapter 4. Logically speaking, it seems that the second condition is redundant, but epistemologically speaking, a case of the co-presence of *A* and *B* may be needed to suggest the possibility, at least, that one may be the sign for the other. Perhaps Dīṇāga's concern here was epistemological.

Dīṇāga's Wheel of Reason/Sign

When a sign is identified, there are three possibilities. The sign may be present in all, some, or none of the *sapakṣas*. Likewise, it may be present in all, some or none of the *vipakṣas*. To identify a sign, we have to assume that it is present in the *paksas*, however, that is, the first condition is already satisfied. Combining these, Dīṇāga constructed his "wheel of reason" with nine distinct possibilities, which may be tabulated in Figure 1.1.

Of these nine possibilities, Dīṇāga asserted that only two are illustrative of sound inference for only they meet all the three conditions. They are Numbers 2 and 8. Notice that either (– *vipakṣa* and + *sapakṣa*), or (– *vipakṣa* and ± *sapakṣa*) would fulfill the required conditions. Dīṇāga is insistent that at least one *sapakṣa* must have the positive sign. Number 5 is not a case of sound inference; this sign is a pseudo-sign. For although it satisfies the two conditions 1 and 3 above, it does not satisfy condition 2. So one can argue that as far as Dīṇāga was concerned all three were necessary conditions. The second row does not satisfy condition 2 and hence none of Numbers 4, 5, and 6 are logical signs; they are pseudo-signs. Numbers 4 and 6 are called "contradictory" pseudo-signs—an improvement upon the old Nyāyasūtra definition.
of contradictory. The middle one, Number 5, is called “uniquely deviating” (asaññihāraṇa), perhaps for the reason that this sign becomes an unique sign of the pakṣa itself, and is not found anywhere else. In Dīnāgā’s system, this sign cannot be a sign for anything else, it can only point to itself reflexively or to its own locus. Numbers 1, 3, 7, and 9 are also pseudo-signs. They are called the “deviating” signs, for in each case the sign occurs in some vipakṣa or other, although each fulfills the second condition. This shows that at least in Dīnāgā’s own view, the second condition (when it is combined with the first) gives only a necessary condition for being an adequate sign, not a sufficient one. In other words, Dīnāgā intended all three conditions jointly to formulate a sufficient condition.

Development of the Wheel by Uddyotakara

Dīnāgā’s system of nine reason-types or sign-types was criticized by Uddyotakara, the Naiyāyikā, who argued that it was incomplete. We will summarize the main points here; they are discussed in greater detail in §4.10 and chapter 5. Dīnāgā did not consider at least two further alternatives: (a) a situation-type where there is no sapakṣa, and (b) a situation-type where there is no vipakṣa. The sign’s absence from all sapakṣas (or all vipakṣas) should be distinguished from these two situations. Let us use “0” for the situation-type which lacks any sapakṣa, or vipakṣa, and “...” for the situation-type where the sign is present in no sapakṣa or vipakṣa (as before). Hence combining the four possibilities + sapakṣa, ± sapakṣa, –sapakṣa, 0 sapakṣa (no sapakṣa) with the other four (+, ±, –, 0) vipakṣa, we get sixteen portions in our wheel of reason, and the new wheel contains more sound inferences, that is, adequate signs. For example,

This is nameable, because this is knowable.

Here “knowability” is the sign, which is adequate and logical for showing the nameability of an entity, for (in the Nyāya system) whatever is knowable is also nameable (that is, expressible in language). Now we cannot have a heterologue or vipakṣa here, for (again according to the Nyāya system) there is nothing that cannot be named (or expressed in language). Within the Buddhist system, another example of the same argument-type would be:

This is impermanent because it is a product.

For Buddhists everything is impermanent and a product. Later Naiyāyikas called this type of sign “kevalāṅgvyayin,” the universal-positive-sign; that is, it is a characteristic of every entity.

Uddyotakara captured another type of adequate reason or logical sign, but he formulated the example of this reasoning (or inference) negatively, that is, in terms of a counterfactual. This was done probably to avoid a doctrinal quandary of the Nyāya school (to which he belonged) in which the explanation of analytic judgements or a priori knowledge always presents a problem. His typical example was:

The living body cannot be without a soul, for if it were it would have been without life.

This is the generalized inference called “universal negative”—kevalavatirekin—in the tradition. The subject S which has a unique property B cannot be without A, for then it would have been without B. Since B is a unique
property of \( S \), and since the presence of \( A \) and \( B \) mutually imply each other, there is no \textit{sapaksa}. But it is a correct inference. Bhāsarvajña (circa 950 AD) did not like the rather roundabout way of formulating the inference-type. He said:

The living body has a soul, for it has life.

But this would verge on unorthodoxy in Nyāya, for (a) the statement of the thesis includes the sign already, and (b) there seems to be a necessary connection between having life and having a soul. The later Nyāya went back to the negative formulation but got rid of the reflex of the counterfactual that Uddyotakara had. If \( A \) and \( B \) are two properties mutually implying each other such that \( B \) can be the definiens (\textit{laksana}) and the class of those possessing \( A \) can be the definiendum, then the following inference is correct:

The subject \( S \) differs from those that are without \( A \), for it has \( B \) (and \( A \) is defined in terms of \( B \).)

This seems to be equivalent to:

\( S \) has \( A \), for it has \( B \).

The verbal statement “\( S \) has \( A \) because it has \( B \),” however, does not expose fully the structure of this type of inference. For one thing, in this version it becomes indistinguishable from any other type of correct inference discussed before. In fact, the special feature of this type of inference is that the inferable property \( A \) is uniquely present in \( S \) alone, and nowhere else, and hence our knowledge of the concomitance or pervasion between \( A \) and \( B \) cannot be derived from an example (where their co-presence will be instantiated) which will be a different case from the \( S \), the case under consideration. In fact, \( S \) here is a generic term and it will be proper to say: all \( S \)s have \( A \), for they have \( B \), and a supporting example will have to be an \( S \), that is, an instance of \( S \). To avoid this anomaly, a negative example is cited to cover these cases. Thus we can say, a non-\( S \) is a case where neither \( A \) nor \( B \) are present. This will allow one to infer, for example, absence of \( B \) from absence of \( A \) and also (since \( A \) and \( B \) are co-present in all cases) absence of \( A \) from absence of \( B \). But the evidence here is \( B \). Hence by seeing absence of \( B \) in all \( S \)s we can infer absence of \( A \). Such a roundabout formulation was dictated by the peculiar nature of the Dharmā-Gaṇaka theory of inference.

Let us try to explain. In this theory, what legitimizes the inference of \( A \) from the sign \( B \) is the knowledge that \( B \) is a logical sign of \( A \). To have that knowledge, we must have another item of knowledge, that \( B \) has concomitance, an invariable connection, with \( A \). The second item of knowledge must be derived empirically, from an example where it is certain that \( A \) as well as \( B \) is present. Without such an example, we would not recognize \( B \) to be a logical sign of \( A \). This limitation precluded the possibility of inferring \( A \) from \( B \), where the case is such that all that have \( A \) are included in \textit{pakṣa}, the subject-locus of the inference. The convention is that the said example cannot be chosen from the members of the \textit{pakṣa}, that is, of the set of \( S \)s. Hence the difficulty.

Uddyotakara saw this problem and extended the scope of the theory by saying that in these cases, a negative example, a non-\( S \) having neither \( A \) nor \( B \), and absence of any counter-example (the sign's absence from all \textit{vipakṣas}), will be enough to legitimize the inference. Udayana (circa 975–1050 AD) later on defended this type of inference as legitimate. For, he said, if we do not admit such inferences as valid, our search for a \textit{defining} property of some concepts could not be justified. Suppose we wish to define cow-hood: what is the unique property of a cow? Now, suppose having a dewlap is a unique property of cow; it exists in all and only cows. What is the purpose of such a “definition,” if we can call it a definition (\textit{laksana})? It is that we can differentiate all cows from non-cows. How? We do it by means of the following inference: cows are distinct from non-cows, for cows have dewlaps. Of course, the statement “cows are distinct from non-cows” is equivalent to the statement “cows are cows,” but when it is put negatively, the purpose of such inference becomes clearer. This important issue will be elaborated in chapter 5, especially §5.8, §5.9, and §5.11.

\textbf{Concomitance or Invariable Relation}

In the \textit{Pramāṇasamuccaya}, Dharmā-Gaṇaka defined the invariable relation or concomitance of \( B \) with \( A \), which legitimizes the inference of the signified \( A \) from the sign \( B \), as follows:

When the sign (\textit{linga}) occurs, there the signified, that of which it is a sign, has to occur as well. And if the sign has to occur somewhere, it has to occur only where the signified occurs (\textit{linge lingi bhavaty eva linginy evetarat punah}).

This verse has been quoted frequently by Naiyāyikas, Jainas, and other logicians. It actually amounts to saying that all cases of \( B \) are cases of \( A \), and only cases of \( A \) could be cases of \( B \).

 Dharmakīrti described the invariable connection in two ways. First, the sign \( B \) could be the “own-nature” or essential mark of \( A \). That amounts to saying that \( B \) is either an invariable or a necessary sign of \( A \). Thus, we infer
that something is a tree from the fact that it is a beech tree, for a beech tree cannot be a beech tree without being a tree. This only defines invariability or necessary connection. The second type of sign is one when we infer the “natural” causal factor from the effect, as we infer fire from smoke. It is also the nature or the essence of smoke that it cannot originate without originating from fire. Hence invariable relation means: (i) an essential or necessary property of the class, and (ii) a casually necessary relation between an effect and its invariable cause. Dharmakirti’s contribution is examined in the early sections of chapter 5.

The late Naiyāyikas said that the absence of a counter-example is what is ultimately needed to legitimize the inference-giving relation between A and B. If B is the sign, then B would be the logical sign if, and only if, there is no case where B occurs but A does not occur. If B occurs where A does not, that would be a counter-example to the tacitly assumed rule of inference, “if B then A.” As we know from the truth-table of the propositional logic, “if B then A” is falsified only under one condition, when not-A is true along with B. Thus Gāṅgāśa (f. 1325 a.d.) defines this relation:

B’s non-occurrence in any location characterized by absence of A.

Alternatively, another definition is given:

B’s co-occurrence with such an A as is never absent from the location of B.

The first is rephrasing of the first definition of vyāpti (invariable concomitance) in the Vyāptipāṇcaka of Gāṅgāśa. The second is an abbreviation of what is called his siddhaṁtakāsana, “accepted definition.” These developments, in the analysis of the concept of the invariable concomitance or inference-warranting relation between sign and signified, made by the later Naiyāyikas, will be elaborated in chapter 7 of this book.

**On the “Steps” in the Process of Inference:**

**Members of the Syllogism**

An essential part of the theory of inference is obviously the knowledge of concomitance or invariance between the inerferable property, A, and the reason, B, the hetu. Our knowledge of such invariances is derived, rightly or wrongly, from our observation of such examples illustrating the togetherness of B and A; we call them sapakṣas. The Nyāyaśūtra author insisted upon the citation of the example to justify or support the reason, to show that there is a relation of concomitance or invariance backing the reason.

A question arises regarding how many steps we need in what is called “parārthānūmanā” or “demonstration to others” of the entire process of inference one makes within oneself. A demonstration is something like the verbal articulation of the process of inference. The Naiyāyikas assert that there should be five steps in this verbal articulation of the inference, where the fifth step would re-state the thesis proven by the reason backed by the required invariance relation. The Buddhists, on the other hand, would need only three steps—statement of the thesis, of the reason, and also of the example. Praśastapāda (circa 450–500 AD) made a very significant comment in his Padārthadharmasamgraha, while he was explaining the five-step verbal articulation of the Nyāya demonstration. The last step is a re-statement of the thesis and, hence, the opponent obviously points out that it is redundant, for the thesis has already been stated and that it is proven by the adequate reason. The thesis is stated in the first step and the reason in the second step. Hence, says Praśastapāda, if we depend upon what is presented not simply verbally but also by implication as well as the significance of what is presented verbally (compare arthāt), then one can only state the first two steps and satisfy the other (opponent) side. We quote (1971: 241):

> Therefore, after stating the thesis, one should verbally articulate only the reason. For intelligent people will be reminded of the invariance based upon prior observation of co-presence and the lack of it (in suitable examples), and therefore they will acknowledge the thesis as established. This verbal articulation should end here (with the statement of the reason).

This was apparently a challenge to the Buddhist to bring down the number of steps in the argument from three to the first two: the thesis and the reason. It is interesting that Dharmakīrti boldly accepted the challenge and said:

> For intelligent people only the reason would be stated (PV II.27).

(There may be a chronological problem here, however. Praśastapāda is considered to be a junior contemporary of Diṇṇāga, for he assimilated all the logical developments of Diṇṇāga into his re-statement of the Nyāya-Vaismesika system of logic. It is also generally believed that he preceded Dharmakīrti. I accept this chronology, and my above comment is based upon its truth. If, however, it can be shown that Dharmakīrti preceded Praśastapāda, then the above statement has to be modified accordingly. My argument here is not concerned with this issue, however, and the chronological controversy would not upset anything else I have said here about logic. It is significant to note
though that Udayana quotes the relevant line of Dharmakirti while he comments on this particular passage of Praśastapāda.)

1.3 INDIAN LOGIC VERSUS WESTERN LOGIC: DIFFERENCES

If one were to ask at the outset, what is the difference between so-called Indian logic and Western logic, the question would be almost a non-starter. We may put a counter question: "What is Western logic?", and thousands of conflicting answers are available from the text books since the time of Aristotle. There is, however, a "modern" conception of logic, and we may try to spell out the difference between Indian conceptions of logic and this. In the broadest terms, one may note briefly the following differences.

First, certain epistemological issues are found to be included in the discussion of what we wish to call "Indian logic." The reason is obvious. Indian logic is primarily a study of inference-patterns, and inference is clearly identified as a source of knowledge, a pramāṇa. So the study includes general questions regarding the nature of the derivation of knowledge from information supplied by evidence, which evidence may itself be another piece of knowledge. Epistemological questions, however, are deliberately excluded from the domain of modern logic.

Second, to a superficial observer, discussion of the logical theories in India would seem to be heavily burdened with psychological and intuitionistic terminology—a feature which, since Frege, logicians in the West have tried carefully to weed out from modern logical discussions. Yet the role of psychology, how one mental event causes another mental event or events and how one is connected with the other, seems to be dominant in the Indian presentation.

The Indians psychologized logic, but perhaps without totally committing the blunder into which an emphasis on psychology may often lead. Thus one may claim that they psychologized logic, without committing the fallacy of psychologism. Alternatively, the claim could be that this was a different conception of logic, where the study of the connections between mental events and the justification of inferentially-acquired knowledge-episodes is not a fault (for a development of this idea, see Matilal 1986, §4.7).

Third, historically, from the time of the Greeks, the mathematical model played an important part in the development of logic in the West. In India, it was grammar, rather than mathematics, that was dominant, and logical theories were influenced by the study of grammar. Why this was so is a question that we cannot answer. This point is to some extent related to the second.

Last but not least, the usual distinction, so well entrenched in the Western tradition, between deduction and induction was not to be found in the same way in the Indian tradition. The argument patterns studied were at best an unconscious mixture of the two processes. Yet it seemed that these mixed patterns were not very far from the way human beings across cultural boundaries would tend in fact to argue or rationally derive conclusions from the available data or evidence or premises.

This last point needs to be emphasized for another reason. Almost all modern treatments of the character of the argument pattern in Indian logic have tended to analyze it as a form of deductive reasoning. At best, this might have contributed to an appreciation that forms of rationality in classical India, to the extent they are reflected in the "logical" argument patterns, were not very different from what they are in the West. However, it has also undermined certain unique features of the Indian argument patterns, or at least blocked our clear understanding and appreciation of such features.

One reason for this confusion of modern scholars is that the inferred conclusion in the Indian theory was regarded as a piece of knowledge derived normally from the observation of adequate evidence, and hence it was accorded that certainty which we usually associate with states of knowledge. Inductive conclusions by contrast are, in today's terms, only probable, although they may sometimes have a very high degree of probability. The inductive element of the argument patterns studied by the Indian philosophers has thus often been lost sight of by modern scholars who emphasize the alleged certainty of the inferred conclusion, and then go on to equate the Indian argument patterns invariably with deductive or syllogistic forms.

Let me develop this point further. Since the time of Stcherbatsky, Randle, and others, and even still today, the typical example of the model of inference in Indian logic is reformulated as follows:

\[ A \quad \text{Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.} \]
\[ \text{There is smoke on the yonder hill.} \]
\[ \text{Therefore there is fire there.} \]

\[ A \] is clearly an example of the form that we call *Barbara* in traditional Aristotelian Logic. In modern first order predicate logic, it would be an example of an inference schema which uses universal instantiation, and would have the form (see Quine, 1961),

\[ ((x) (Fx \supset Gx) \cdot Fa) \supset Ga. \]

\[ A \] is derived from, and hence regarded as transformationally equivalent to, the following presentation of the argument, which is the one *actually* used in the Indian texts:
The hill is fire-possessing. Because it is smoke-possessing (or because of smoke). For example, the kitchen.

The idea being considered is that whoever asserts \( B \) means exactly \( A \).

The common reconstruction of the Indian argument pattern, \( B \), is in fact more often presented, not exactly as \( A \), but as

\[ A': \text{ Wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen.} \]
\[ \text{There is smoke on the yonder hill} \]
\[ \text{Therefore there is fire there.} \]

The argument pattern \( A \) undergoes, however, an often unnoticed but important metamorphosis when it is presented as \( A' \). The citation of the example, "kitchen" underscores first of all the fact that unlike the first proposition in \( A \) (or Aristotle's universal premise) the premise here is unambiguous. For the schema "\( (x) (Fx \supset Gx) \)" in \( A \) represents any universal proposition with or without existential presupposition (for the problems related to the existential import of the subject term of universal propositions in Aristotle, such as "All \( S \) is \( P \)" or "All \( Fs \) are \( Gs \)", one may consult P. F. Strawson, 1966). However, the citation of an example in the first proposition of \( A' \) shows that it is a universal proposition along with existential import. In other words, the subject term now is definitely non-empty.

In the above \( A' \), and in \( B \), the insistence on the presence of an example should thus not be lightly dismissed as an inessential detail. For it brings to the fore the inductive nature of the first premise, and thereby exposes the "weakness" of the entire argument pattern from a purely deductive point of view. The Indian philosopher of logic did not generally think of this feature as an indicator of the weakness of their theory of inference (although the skeptics, as well as the Čārvāka or the Lokāyata, who were opponents of the idea that inference is a source of knowledge, severely attacked the theory just on this ground). To counter this attack, the Indian logicians sought some way to accord the conclusion of this type of argument almost the same degree of certainty that is given to the conclusion of a normal deductive argument. However, the point remains that the importance attached to the citation of an example in the Indian schema, \( B \), highlights the fact that it cannot be reconstructed as a purely deductive argument, along the lines of \( A \).

It is a commonplace in modern logic to distinguish between truth and validity. Roughly, validity has to do with the rules of inference in a given theory. The conclusion may be validly derived from the premises, if and only if the rules of inference are not violated, while it may still be a false judgement. The soundness of the conclusion in deduction depends also upon the adequacy or the truth of the premises. It is now-a-days claimed that a logician's concern is with the validity of inference, not with its soundness, which may depend upon extra-logical factors (the truth of the premises). This is the ideal in formal logic. In India, however, this distinction was not often made, for the philosophers wanted their "logically" derived inferences or their conclusions also to be pieces of knowledge. Thus, validity must be combined with truth. It was allowed that some wild guesses or "invalidly" derived inferences might happen to be true. Such "invalid" derivation, however, would not be a proper route to knowledge. This point will be further clarified when we discuss Dinnāga in chapter 4.

The point just made is that Indian logic is not formal logic. This does not imply, however, that by introducing some aspects of formal logic in order to interpret the Indian theories we cannot gain any sort of deeper understanding of Indian logic. In fact, we can. Hence, reductions to Aristotelian syllogistic inference along the above lines, and even modified use of Venn diagrams (for example, Chi, 1969), have very often been fruitful in our attempt to understand, analyze and explain the Indian theories, as long as they are taken in context.

Let me develop this point a little further. Since Łukasiewicz, it has been fairly well-known in the West that Aristotle's syllogistic need not be interpreted as resting on an ontology of individuals and the mechanism of quantification. It can be seen instead as involving four operators "\( A \)" "\( E \)" "\( I \)" and "\( O \)" treated as primitives, holding upon variables "\( u \)" and "\( v \)" which range over non-empty terms (which stand for properties or sorts). This dispenses with the standard logical subject-predicate analysis of sentences, in which the subject identifies an object and the predicate sorts (is true of) that object. Modern logic in the Fregean tradition, on the other hand, requires, in its semantics, a domain of individuals, to which are attached properties and relations. Likewise, by subjecting the inference-patterns formulated and studied in the logical texts of India to various different reductions and translations, we might get closer to the nature of Indian logical theories, provided we remain cautious and sensitive to the peculiarities and differences. Venn diagrams, rules of propositional and first order predicate logic, some issues from the logic of classes and relations—all these can be used in our study, if only to underline the differences and uniqueness of Indian logic.

As far as the inductive character of the Indian argument pattern is concerned, it is reminiscent of J. S. Mill's theory of inference and induction. Presently we will see how the general premise is supposed to be supported by a positive as well as a negative example, called the homologue (\( sapakṣa \)) and heterologue (\( vipakṣa \)). This invites comparison with Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference, which is regarded as stronger, in its power to generate certainty or high probability, than either the Method of Agreement
or that of Difference, when employed independently. Mill, however, obtains certainty by implicitly basing his theory upon a presumed relation of strict and necessary causation between the observed and inferred properties, thereby ruling out accidentally true generalizations. Indian argument patterns too were initially based upon a number of ontological relations, causation, part-and-whole, essential identity and so on, and this feature justified the so-called assumption of certainty or knowledgment of the inferred conclusions. However, the history of inference unfolded differently in India, for there it took the form of a search for a logical, that is, inference-warranting relation, which was called *vyāpti*—“pervasión” or “concomitance,” between the evidence and the conclusion.

We may conclude this section with a quotation of H. N. Randle, who, incidentally, wrote a paper on Indian logic long ago in the journal *Mind* (Randle, 1924). In his book, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, published by Oxford University Press in 1930, he said:

> Indian formalism in fact seems to break off abruptly at the point at which western formalism begins, perhaps by a fortunate instinct. (1930: 233, fn. 3)

He was obviously no lover of formal logic, and perhaps would have been surprised by today’s development in the area of formal logic in the West. However, he continued:

> But if formal logic is admitted to have a certain methodological value—I think it is as good a mental discipline to turn [Dīnāgā’s] wheel of the reasons as to plough the sands of Barbara and Celarent. The study of either logic is almost a necessary introduction to the philosophical literature of either civilization. (Ibid.)

The world of philosophy and scholarship has moved a long way since the days of Randle. Still, what he said in the concluding sentence of the above passage is very true even today.

### 1.4 Some General Characteristics: Subject and Predicate

Any study of logic is intimately connected with the language in which it is conducted. Needless to say, the Indian “logicians” did not use symbols, formulae, or axiomatic constructions in an artificial or formal language. Indian logical theories were discussed primarily in Sanskrit, and the structure of the Sanskrit language figures prominently here. This fact has created some problems of interpretation, for it is extremely difficult, though not impossible,

[to transfer the philosophical and logical problems from the narrow confines of Sanskrit to the modern philosophical audience in general.

It is commonplace in logic to talk about the analysis of propositions. In the context of logic in Sanskrit, we have to talk about the analysis of Sanskrit propositions. A Sanskrit proposition is what is expressed in a Sanskrit sentence. It will appear that the analysis proposed by the early Sanskrit writers would not be entirely unfamiliar to one accustomed to the usual subject-predicate analysis of modern or traditional Western logic, nor is it unrelated to it. However, the logical as well as grammatical analysis of Sanskrit sentences presents some significant contrasts with the usual subject-predicate analysis. Unless these points of contrast are noted, it will be difficult to appreciate fully some of the concerns of the Sanskrit logicians.

A sentence in Sanskrit is regarded as the expression of a “thought” or what is called a cognitive state (*jñāna*), or, to be precise, a qualificative cognitive state (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*). A simple qualificative cognitive state is one where the cognizer cognizes something (or some place or some locus, as we will have to call it) as qualified by a property or a qualifier. It is claimed by most Sanskrit writers that to say that something or some place is qualified by a qualifier is equivalent to saying that it is a locus of some property or “locatable.” As I have discussed elsewhere (Matilal, 1968, 1971), a qualitative cognition is actually to be thought of as a propositional cognition or a judgement. In this and subsequent sections, we will investigate how the Indian analysis of the structure of such states relates to Western analyses of the subject-predicate distinction.

A proposition, in its basic form, is usually explained by Western writers in terms of what we call a *predication*. A simple or atomic proposition is thus better understood as involving the “basic combination” of predication. This expression—“basic combination”—was once used by W. V. Quine (1960: 96). The idea was sharpened by P. F. Strawson (1974). Strawson explains the structure of the so-called basic combination of predication as (1) a combination of (2) a subject and (3) a predicate, and said that it lies at the focal point of our current logic. He has further claimed that:

> if current logic has the significance which we are inclined to attach to it, and which our contemporary style of philosophizing in particular assumes, then it must reflect fundamental features of our thought about the world. (1974: 4)

The claim may be too strong. For all we can say is that the said structure reflects primarily the basic way in which we are accustomed to think about the world. We might be trained and then be accustomed to think about the world in a different way, but in that case our language would not admit a
predominantly subject-predicate structure. This is at least conceivable. In Jonathan Swift’s *Gulliver’s Travels*, three professors of the School of Languages at the Grand Academy of Lagado, were trying to work on a project that would shorten the academic discourse by leaving out, among other things, “verbs and participles, because in reality all things imaginable are but nouns” (p. 219, 1919 edn.). The point is that while a project need not be a radical or outlandish as this one, even a slightly different proposal may appear odd or queer to our readers today who are well-acquainted to modern qualificational logic as well as the subject-predicate analysis of the basic sentences.

The “current” logicians generally agree that the basic predication may best be pictured in the neutral logical schema “Fa.” It represents a combination of a singular term or a (proper) name and, to use Quine’s terminology, a general term or a *predicate*, a combination which forms a sentence. By “general term” are meant such grammatical terms as substantives, adjectives, and verbs. (Even names or so-called singular terms can be systematically parsaes as *predicates* by following the Russellian trick of representing them as descriptions. However this part of Quine’s proposal is controversial and may be ignored for the moment.) Verbs, according to Quine, may be regarded as the “fundamental form” of predication, and the adjectivals and the nominals (substantives) may be assimilated into the “verbals.” In other words, such phrases as “…is an *F*” and “…is *F*” are mere stylistic variants of the verb form “… *F*.” Predication, then, is illustrated indifferently by “Mama is a Woman,” “Mama is big,” and “Mama sings” (1960: 96).

Strawson analyses the “basic propositional combination” as a tripartition of function, as I have already noted. This is represented by a simple symbolism “ass (*i c*),” where “*i*” represents a particular, “*c*” the concept specification and “ass (* )” the propositional combination. The former two underline the duality, that, following Strawson, we may still call the subject and the predicate, while the isolation of the third element is important to capture the function of presenting the particular and the general concept as assigned to each other in such a way as to have a propositional combination. In our “ground level” subject-predicate sentence, the third function is usually associated with the second. Hence the *predicate* is usually a verb or a “verbal phrase,” that combines syntactically the concept-specifying element and the indication of propositionality.

This dual role of our ordinary predicate phrases must be recognized, even if we try to maintain Quine’s striceties against the predicate-term being accessible to quantifiers or the variables of quantification. Apart from worries about ontological commitment to abstract (in Quine’s words, intentional) properties, there does not seem to be any good reason why we cannot quantify over the predicate-properties which are denoted by singular abstract terms such as “sweetness” or “singing.”

Now, in the Indian context, the basic combination is not called a proposition. It is a structured whole that is grasped by an atomic cognitive event. We call it an atomic *qualificative* (*viśīṣta*) cognition. One element is called the *qualifier* while the other the *qualificand*, and their combination forms the structured whole. It can be represented by:

\[ Q (a b) \]

where “*a*” represents the qualificand, “*b*” the qualifier, and “*Q( )*” the indication of “qualificativity.” I shall be using these symbols for convenience only, as I have done in my earlier writings (especially Matilal, 1968). One can read “*Q (a b)*” as “*a* qualified by *b*.” The similarity of this symbolism with Strawson’s “ass (* i c* )” may not be only superficial. As far as the separation of the syncategorematic element of a given combination is concerned, both agree. Both leave us open to treat the “predicate” element as a singular (abstract) property. For the cognition of a blue pot can be expressed either as a sentence (“This pot is blue.”) or as a phrase (“this blue pot”). Besides, our symbolism admits the following two basic rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \quad Q (a b) \cdot Q (a c) \rightarrow Q (a (b c)) \\
(2) & \quad Q (a b) \cdot Q (b c) \rightarrow Q (a (Q (b c))).
\end{align*}
\]

“*Q (a (b c))*” can be read as “*a* is qualified by both *b* and *c*” and “*Q(a Q (b c))*” as “*a* is qualified by *b*, and *b* in its turn is qualified by *c*.”

### 1.5 Qualifier versus Predicate-Property

A qualifier and a predicate-property may not always be the same, such that we can say that there is only a terminological variation. In fact, an Indianist would like to say that not all predicate-properties are qualifiers nor are all qualifiers predicate-properties. This is not simply because in an expression such as “there lies the blue pot” the qualifier, which is the blue pot, would probably not be called a predicate-property. Even if we concede this, still, in a given situation, a predicate-property, that is, what the Indianist would call a *vidheya-dharma*, may not be the same as the qualifier property (*viśēṣana*). Let me illustrate this point. Suppose I wish to infer a property, *s*, as belonging to a given locus, *p*. Naturally the inferable, for example, the to-
be-inferred property (sādhya), would be the vidheya-dharma, for example, the predicate-property. According to our basic intuition, the subject is what is being talked about and the predicate is what is being talked about. Sometimes, it has been said to be a distinction between that and what. Consider now the following two "propositionally equivalent" verbalized expressions, representing two numerically different knowledge-episodes:

(a) Sound (noise) is impermanent (that is, impermanence possessing).

(b) Impermanence resides in sound (noise).

The qualifier in the first is impermanence, while in the second, it is residence-in-sound. The qualificand in (a) is sound but in (b) impermanence is the qualificand. Thus, the qualifier-qualificand distinction is always related to the structure of some knowledge-episode or qualitative cognition. However both (a) and (b) can alternatively be reached as inferred conclusions, for example, as the resulting knowledge-episodes of a process of inference. In either case, the to-be-inferred property, that is, the predicate-property, remains the same, impermanence. For, it does not matter whether (a) is reached or derived from the knowledge-episode (premise), "sound has product-hood which is pervaded by impermanence" or (b) is reached from "Product-hood which is pervaded by impermanence resides in sound;" in either case, it cannot be denied that impermanence is the property we wish to establish by the inference. This may lead one to believe that the qualifier-qualificand distinction is perhaps closer to a subject-predicate distinction conceived as based upon a grammatical criterion (confer Strawson, 1974), though even this could be misleading.

1.6 A SKELETAL THEORY OF INFERENCE

The last point in §1.5 may appear a bit enigmatic unless we give an account of a skeletal theory of inference in the context of Indian logic. This skeletal theory seems to be presupposed, consciously or unconsciously, in all the representations of inference-patterns in India, although it became more explicitly formulated somewhat later in the history. I shall present it as a theory of substitution, where one property, by virtue of its logical relation with another property, forces the substitution of the latter in its place. That is (taking "p" to stand for the locus or paksā of the inference, "h" for the reason-property or hetu, and "s" for the to-be-inferred property or sādhya:

INTRODUCING INDIAN LOGIC

(1) There is h-pervaded-by-s in p

leads to:

(2) There is s in p.

Alternatively,

(3) p has h pervaded-by-s

leads to:

(4) p has s.

In an historically earlier version, found in the Nyāya-sūtra and other contemporaneous texts, this was formulated as:

(5) There is h-connected-with-s in p

leads to:

(6) There is s in p.

The spelling out of "connected-with..." in terms of "pervaded-by..." was how progress in the history of Indian logic was achieved, among other things. We will have occasion to come back to the various ways in which the phrase "connected-with..." as well as "pervaded-by..." were expanded.

To add flesh to this skeleton, I give an example:

(7) Sound has product-hood-connected-with-impermanence

leads to:

(8) Sound has impermanence.

This is an elaboration, presumably with minimized distortion, of the following:

(9) Sound has impermanence, because of its product-hood.

As we have seen in §1.3, (9) has generally been transformed, by almost all modern interpreters, into a proto-Barbara:
All products are impermanent.
Sound is a product.
Therefore, Sound is impermanent.

Or, sometimes, it is rendered as:

Whatever is a product is impermanent.
Sound is a product.
Therefore, Sound is impermanent.

This is equivalent in structure to the schema $A$ in §1.3. Our “substitution” model, however, follows more closely the actual analysis offered by the Indian logicians. With this skeletal model before us, we can now look more closely at the qualificand-qualifier distinction and its relation to the subject-predicate distinction.

1.7 MASS TERMS

The Sanskrit logicians tried to explain the structure of the “atomic” qualitative knowledge with a model that I have earlier called the “property-location” model. This, in some respect, resembles what Strawson (1959) has described as a “feature-placing” language. In a “feature-placing” language, Strawson notes, the subject-predicate distinction has no place. The model sentence would be something like “$ϕ$ is here” or “there is $ϕ$ here now.” One advantage here is that this language gives place-and-time-identifying expressions the status of what are called logical subject-expressions, and spatial and temporal regions take the place of ordinary particulars. There are serious limitations of such a language, as have been discussed by Strawson, although he has pointed out that, in a feature-placing language, “we can find the ultimate propositional level we are seeking (Strawson, 1959: 209).” In the above, we have seen that the Sanskrit logicians concentrated upon a structure of knowledge-episodes that is akin to this form, for the locus, $p$, can be (in fact, has been) interpreted as a spatio-temporal location, where the to-be-inferred property, $s$, is to be located. In one formulation (see Dhānāga’s texts) the word “atra” is explicitly used. This means “here” or even “here-now,” if the understood verbal element (“ast”) is in the present tense.

W. V. Quine, while he was discussing the category of “mass terms” (a phrase coined by Otto Jespersen), which resemble the “feature-universals” of Strawson, remarked that these mass terms represent a primitive, archaic survival of a level of thought, the one developmentally where the baby has not apparently learned to identify particulars. Of course, the assumption involv-

ing baby-psychology is open to question. However, the point is that our adult language retains a considerable number of mass terms. Moreover, the category of mass terms has been the “problem child” of quantification theory, for the referents of these terms do not easily yield to individuation and hence we cannot quantify over them.

The problem of fitting mass terms to quantification, or “feature-words” to sortals, is a genuine one. Quine’s proposal has particularly been under attack, for example by T. Parsons (1970), R. Harvey (1978, 1979), and Helen Cartwright (1970). J. van Heijenoort (1974) has argued that the grammar of the mass-term is “far from being a negligible side-show” (p. 264), for “stuff-talk is an important part of our language, parallel to object talk” (p. 265). It has been noted that in modern physics there has been “the true systematization of stuff-ontology” (p. 266). It has further been noted that abstract terms are also “much-terms,” that is, the grammar of abstract terms, such as prettiness and courage, is similar to the grammar of mass terms. Sometimes it has been facetiously remarked that English may not have real “count names” (Sharkey). A. N. Prior once suggested (1976: 183) that “possibly all things are, or can be said to be made of stuff.”

Our stuff-talk can be connected with property-talk, for there seems to be an obvious connection between stuff-ontology and property-ontology. Suppose by “property” we mean non-universal, abstract features, or even tropes, for example, the property of being a swimmer or the ability to swim. This will be a non-universal, if we believe, as we probably should, that this ability to swim varies from person to person, for there may not be a single objective property that we can talk about here. This will then be a perfect example of what the Nyāya call an “imposed” property or upādhi. The use of the same expression “ability to swim” would then be like the use of the term “water” for water found in different spatio-temporal locations, as the river-water now is different from the water in this glass.

Consider a thought experiment. We may mentally integrate the individually located water stuff in this world into a spatially integrated whole. “Water” then becomes a singular term referring to this whole, which has a spatio-temporal spread. Then to talk about the water in this glass we can delimit the stuff by its spatio-temporal location. We can likewise conceptually integrate all the different abilities to swim that are found in various agents into a “conceptual spread,” and to talk about John’s ability to swim, we can delimit this abstract feature, the ability to swim, by its spatio-temporal location, in this case, John.

The purpose of this exercise has been to show that the problem of individuation of a stuff like water is similar to that of an abstract feature, or a non-universal property. Thus, consider:
The water in this glass is cold, and

John’s ability to swim is poor (from: John is a poor swimmer).

The Sanskrit logicians would see them as equivalent to the following analyses:

Water, which is characterized by being a locatee, where such locatee-hood is conditioned by a location-hood resident in the glass, has coldness (or is cold-ness possessing).

The ability to swim is characterized by being a locatee, where such locatee-hood is conditioned by a location-hood resident in John, has the quality of being poor.

In both cases, we have to add also that the locatee-hood is delimited by the present time. This can be further sharpened to take care of other well-known indexicals.

1.8 Property: Locus and Locatee

I have been suggesting that a “property-location” model best suits the arguments and inference-patterns studied in Sanskrit. What is this model? As we have noted, to some extent it appears to be similar to the imaginary language called the “language without particulars,” or “feature-placing” language, which was described by Strawson (1959). He has also pointed out the limitations of such a language. The Sanskrit logicians’ language is not exactly the same, there being important differences which will be noted presently. It is not clear, however, whether, in virtue of these differences, the language studied and developed by the Sanskrit logicians would overcome the alleged difficulties faced by feature-placing languages.

First, a terminological problem: using the word “property” as a translation of the Sanskrit word “dharma” has rather unfortunate consequences, for the word “dharma” has a wider extension than the word “property,” and also has many non-logical connotations. But the situation need not be regarded as hopeless. “Dharma” sometimes means not only abstract properties or universals but also concrete features, that is, the particular features of some object or locus. “Dharma” and “dharmin” constitute a pair in Sanskrit that is equivalent to the pair “locatee” (or the locatable) and “locus” (location, which may be a place or a time or even an abstract object). What Strawson called a “feature” would be a locatee on this view.

A particular property is not a “property-particular,” but a locatee (or a locatable) can be a particular in the sense of being a unique characteristic of a singular locus: for example, sky-hood belonging to the sky, and the sky only. The particular feature of a person would be her unique dharma or a locatee of which she is the locus. However, dharmas in Sanskrit include not only qualities like color and shape, attributes like the motion of a moving body, abstract universals like pot-hood or cow-hood, but also the concrete substantial masses like the particular body of water or fire, or even such concrete objects like a post or a rock!

It is the last two groups of dharma or locatee that would call for some explanation. It would be very difficult to call them “properties,” if we followed the conventions of the English language. That is why I have chosen terms like “locatee” or “the locatable.” Consider the following sentences:

There is black ice on the road.

There is fire on the hill.

There is a pot on the ground.

These three would be transformationally equivalent to:

The road has black-ice on it, or, the road is black-ice possessing.

The hill is fire possessing.

The ground is pot possessing.

The expressions (4)–(6) clearly underscore the locus-locatee model by combining two particulars, if we rephrase them as:

Some black-ice is located on the road.

Some (body of) fire is on the hill.

Some (indefinite) pot is on the ground.

Here the left-hand side gives the locates and the right hand side the loci. This is not a language without particulars, rather a language with particulars only, the universal element being implicitly present only in the relational factor—the combiner of locus and locatee. The Sanskrit linguistic intuition would allow us to call the three elements, black-ice, fire, and a pot, dharmas of their respective loci (dharmins). But we cannot call them properties, according to the ordinary linguistic intuition of English. For it is counterintuitive to call a pot a property of the ground on which it is present. Let us see why.
The logical language in Sanskrit was obviously influenced by the grammatical analysis of the Sanskrit language. This is a thesis which scholars like Staal and Fadd deg formulated, though they never cited any cogent argument in its favor. Certain grammatical operations are particularly relevant here: namely, use of the location suffixes and the reciprocal use of the possessive suffixes. We can say, “There is a pot on the ground” (= bhūtale ghatah), which is equivalent to “The ground (is) pot-possessing” (= ghatavat bhūtaśam). This equivalence in Sanskrit is much like the equivalence between passive and active constructions in English. The expression “pot-possessing” is a bit odd, and sounds artificial in English due to the paucity of possessive suffixes in English. One may think of “health” and “healthy” or “wealth” and “wealthy,” but these are rare. On the other hand, “ghatavat” (= pot-possessing) seems as common in Sanskrit as “sweet” or “blue,” or other such adjectival expressions.

A predicate expression, in the canonical notation of Quine, is syntactically akin to a verb since it combines the double function of specifying a general concept and a propositional combination. If a predicate expression is taken to be a sortal, then it is syntactically akin to a common noun. The nominal “man” or “pot” specifies a general concept that supplies the principle of individuating the particulars it collects. Analogically, we may speak of the predicate expressions of the Sanskrit logicians as syntactically akin to the adjectivals. Adjectives are usually found without articles or plurals, although there are certain clear cases of adjectives that specify sortal universals, or to use Quine’s term, terms which “divide their reference” for example the term “spherical.”

Adjectives and mass terms (feature-words) share some grammatical properties. However the received opinion has been that we will be better off by assimilating the adjectives into general terms, whose paradigms are sortal-terms. The grammar of our adult language provides us with the mechanism of deriving an abstract property from each adjectival. This is as much true of a natural language like Sanskrit as it is of English and Latin. Thanks to the predominance of “have” verbs in English or Latin, use of abstract singular terms derived from adjectives or nouns does not sound odd in such languages. Thus “a is f” or “this mango is sweet” can be easily rephrased as “a has f-ness” or “this mango has sweetness.” In Sanskrit the “have” verb is usually missing, but the use of genitive and locative suffixes makes a smooth transition from the adjectival to the abstract singulars possible, for example:

(10) patō nilāḥ (= The cloth (is) blue)

(11) pātasya nilimā (asti) (= The blue color of the cloth is there)

(12) pate nilam (asti) (= There is blue color in the cloth).

Although these are equivalent, (11) seems to particularize the general concept “blue color,” that is, the locatee.

The most common form of the substantive suffix in Sanskrit is -tvā or -tā (comparable to English “-ness” or “-hood”). This mechanism of substantivization turns both adjectivals and nominals into words expressing the so-called abstract locatables. And a locatee-word can easily be turned into an adjectival by the use of possessive suffixes, -vat, -mat and -in. Sanskrit logicians use this double mechanism of substantivizing and possessive suffixes to assimilate the usual subject-predicate sentences into their locus-locatee model. Thus:

(13) The mango is sweet

becomes

(14) The mango is sweetness-possessing.

Remember the maneuver from (4)–(6) to (7)–(9). Can we do the same maneuver in (14)? (14) would then be:

(15) (There is) sweetness-possessing-ness in the mango,

or

(16) (There is) sweetness in the mango.

We are back to the locus-locatee model, where here the locus = the mango, and the locatee = sweetness-possessing-ness = sweetness. So far very few would object to the equation—sweet-ness-possessing-ness = sweetness. Can we generalize it? Can we say:

(17) x-possessing-ness = x?

Sanskrit logicians argue that the two operations—use of possessive suffix and substantivization—are reciprocal to each other. Hence,

(18) x + vat + tvā = x,

(tadvatvam tad eva). If we accept this, then we have to allow such equations as:

(19) Fire-possessing-ness = fire.

(20) Pot-possessing-ness = pot or (a pot?).
This means that as locatees or dharmas, it does not make a difference whether we say “fire-possessing-ness” or “fire.” On the other hand, ontological worries notwithstanding, one may call pot-possessing-ness a property of the ground, but not “pot” or a pot. But as locatees, dharmas, there is not much difference! That is, at least, the claim by the Sanskrit logicians. The Sanskrit grammarians who discuss the meaning of the suffixes such as -vya and -vya, 
would support such conversions.

The oddity of this claim must be explained further. The expression “pot-possessing” is an adjectival or what Strawson calls a g-word. Hence it is on a par with “sweetness-possessing.” We may accept “sweetness-possessing-ness” as being conveniently abbreviated as, or equated to, “sweetness,” for both denote in some sense, abstract properties. But (19) and (20) do not seem to be acceptable equations because not only is a pot or fire a “concrete” object (as in “a pot is blue” or “fire burns”) but even their predicative use (“This is a pot” or “This is fire”) introduces a sortal universal, a concept, that applies to an object that the subject term is supposed to identify. The proposal of the Sanskrit logicians seems to be one for a third use of such terms, distinct from “pot” in the subject place or the predicate place. The word in (20) introduces a locatee—a non-particular potty feature of some locus. The word “fire” in (19) then introduces a locatee—a fiery feature, or fire-presence. We may recall here that Quine has remarked that the feature-words or the mass terms have the “hybrid air of abstract singular terms.” We may substitute “genuine” for “hybrid,” for a locatee such as fire may be a quasi-abstract entity. The word “pot” in (20) may then be regarded as indicating a potty substance or pot-presence, to bring it closer to fire, a feature as in (19).

We have thus clarified what the Sanskrit logicians meant by dharma and dharmin, the locatee and the locus. We may translate dharma as “property” only out of politeness. But to do justice to such cases as (19) and (20), we may use “locatee” or “the locatable.” This category of the locatee seems to include not only general attributes, but also abstract and quasi-abstract entities. If the expression “pot” seems awkward we may make it “pot-presence.” In fact, what I shall call (in chapter 7) the presence-range and absence-range of such locatees or dharmas would be more useful in the formulation of the rules of inference in this language.