Chapter 3
*Intuition* in Classical Indian Philosophy:
*Laying the Foundation for a Cross-Cultural Study*

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Introduction

The central question that this paper aims to lay a foundation for is:

CQI: What can we learn about intuition, and how can our understanding of the purported phenomenon of knowledge by intuition be enhanced through a cross-cultural philosophical investigation of it?

One can gain a better understanding of the relevance of CQI by contrasting it with two distinct questions:

EQI: What can we learn about intuition, and how can our understanding of the purported phenomenon of knowledge by intuition be enhanced through an experimental investigation of it?

AQI: What can we learn about intuition, and how can our understanding of the purported phenomenon of knowledge by intuition be enhanced by an analytic investigation of it?
Psychology, cognitive science, and experimental philosophy have provided a lot of engaging research on EQI. Analytic philosophers and phenomenologists have provided a lot of engaging insight on AQI. Our plan here is to begin work on CQI. Our work will proceed by examining theories and uses of intuition across five different schools of Indian thought. We will use the term *intuition* to refer to the English terms ‘intuition’ and ‘intuitive’, as well as the Sanskrit terms prajñā, yogā pratyakṣa, pratībhi pramāṇa, arṣajñāna, and siddhadarśana. These Sanskrit terms are often translated as being in the semantic range of at least some of the prominent uses of ‘intuition’ and ‘intuitive’ in English. The core use of *intuition* we will be engaging can roughly be captured as follows: An *intuition* is a mental state that is an information-bearing awareness that is not the consequence of an explicit conscious inference, testimony, or sensory perception of one’s immediate environment. The main sources we will engage are:

1. The Nyāya Theory
2. The Vaiśeṣika Theory
3. A Buddhist Theory
4. The Yoga Theory
5. The Mīmāṃsā Critique

This list of sources is not exhaustive of the possible sources one could engage in a general study of *intuition*. As one might imagine when considering EQI, there are numerous theories and uses of *intuition* in:

6. Moral Philosophy
7. Philosophical Methodology
8. Philosophy of Mathematics
9. Phenomenology
10. Cognitive Science
11. Psychology

and

12. Behavioral Economics

However, aside from a brief treatment of 6 and 8 for the purposes of the present work, we shall not be dealing with 7, 9–12. The motivation for our restriction of possible sources is primarily based on the fact that the most important recent work on *intuition* is Osbeck and Held’s, O&H, (2014) Rational Intuition. Their excellent work brings together important work across (6)–(12). We partly conceive our work here as a complement to their work by way of adding in information about (1)–(5), and then offering some comparisons between *intuition* talk in Indian philosophy and *intuition* talk in Western philosophy, especially with respect to

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1 For example see Alexander (2012) and Kahneman (2011). For discussion see Vaidya (2010).
2 For example, I will be leaving out uses of ‘intuition’ on which the speaker means no more than what is conveyed by ‘having hunch’ or ‘making a guess’.
moral philosophy, the philosophy of mathematics, and both Yoga and Buddhist accounts of *intuition*.

We will close this introduction by making two sets of comments. The first set of comments will be about the recent history of studies of *intuition* from a comparative point of view. We will do this by providing some preliminary comparative commentary on O&H’s *Introduction to Rational Intuition*. The purpose of this preliminary commentary will be to draw into focus some work by 20th century Indian philosophers on *intuition* that engages a core point that O&H draw out in their sketch of the history of *intuition* research in the 20th century. The second set of comments will serve as an orienting guide to classical Indian *pramāṇa* theory, within which one finds discussion of *intuition*.

*Intuition* in 20th Century Western Psychology and Philosophy and Indian Philosophy

According to O&H’s *Introduction to Rational Intuition* there is a stark contrast in how *intuition* talk was received in scientific circles at the beginning of the 20th century in comparison to contemporary discussions. Their main point is that in the beginning of the 20th century research by scientists into *intuition* was more or less frowned upon. By contrast, research on *intuition* is now growing in a number of scientific fields, such as economics and linguistics.

On their account, John Laird’s *Introspection and Intuition* voices an important view about intuition that displays the early disdain toward *intuition* research. In this work Laird comments on *intuition* with respect to those that follow Bergson’s philosophy. He says of Bergson’s followers that:

[They] believe that psychology is a science touched with the palsy of the intellect, and tarred with that practical brush which can never find use for truth, while intuition pertains to any metaphysics that understands itself, and consequently is beyond the scope of scientific psychology.

(O&H 2014: 1).

Laird’s comments suggest, prima facie, that *intuition* talk is beyond the scope of science. One might further unpack the unscientific nature of *intuition* talk at the beginning of the 20th century by drawing attention to the influence of logical positivism on the growth of psychology. On some accounts of logical positivism metaphysics is non-verifiable by definition, since the propositions that are in the domain of metaphysics admit of no method of verification. One might conjecture on the basis of this position the following argument:

1. Psychology is scientific.
2. Metaphysics is non-scientific.
3. Intuition is tied to metaphysical understanding.
4. So, intuition is not tied to scientific understanding.

The argument itself is suspect in many ways. For example, it could be that "intuition" operates in different ways but is important in both science and metaphysics. At least one way to argue for this position would be to defend the view that "intuition" does not pick out a common kind of mental state. Nevertheless, the importance of the argument lies not in its soundness, but rather in the cultural pressure, as opposed to the rational pressure, the ideology behind it places on "intuition" talk.

What is interesting from a comparative philosophical point of view is that the view of "intuition" expressed by Bergson, and criticized by Laird, is echoed in the work of at least two important early 20th century Indian philosophers: Sri Aurobindo and S. Radhakrishnan. For example, Radhakrishnan associates "intuition" with the notion of "integral experience," which according to Hawley (2006) can be understood in three ways. First, intuition is integral in the sense that it coordinates and synthesizes all other experiences. Second, it is integral in that all other experiences are integrated into a unified whole. It is integral as it forms the basis of all other experiences. All experiences are at bottom intuitional. Third, it is integral in that it integrates one's experience into the life of the individual for social purposes and action. But most importantly, Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan share a religious mystical conception of "intuition" in experience. Thus, if science and religion are seen as opposites, then within at least one strand of 20th century Indian philosophy "intuition" is presented as being something that is outside of the scope of scientific investigation.

However, it is important to note that this is not the whole story. K. C. Bhattacharyya, another important and influential early 20th century Indian philosopher, does not appear to share the views of Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan. Bhattacharyya's conception of "intuition" derives from his conception of metaphysics. Metaphysics for Bhattacharyya is conceived of as being non-empirical and a priori. More importantly, it is not necessarily mystical and religious, like that of Aurobindo and Radhakrishnan. On one interpretation, Bhattacharyya's metaphysics would be construed as being Husserlian in nature—concerning the science of all sciences and the essences of all entities. On the Husserlian account of metaphysics, "intuition" would be thought of as a way of gaining evidence for the nature of entities as studied in metaphysics.

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3See M. Hawley (2006) for this characterization of "integral" in the work of Radhakrishnan.
4This conception of K. C. Bhattacharyya is influenced by Mohanty's (1993b) reading of Bhattacharyya as a metaphysician especially with respect to his views on reflective experience and metaphysics. Mohanty glosses his thought as follows, "Reflection is an act of distinguishing whose objective correlate is the distinct entity qua distinct. Space, time or self, which are objects of metaphysical knowledge, are all given in pre-reflective experience, but only as undistinguished from, and fused with the empirical world. It is the task of metaphysics to let them emerge in their distinctness and with their full autonomy (pg. 35)."
As a conjecture it is possible that the different conceptions of the role of *intuition* in human experience coming out of Indian philosophy in the 20th century came from two distinct pressures that are a function of how Indian philosophy was to be presented as India moved out of colonial rule by the British. On the one hand, there was a desire on the part of some, such as Radhakrishnan, also the first President of India, to present Indian philosophy as being somehow unique and different from Western science (Bilimoria 1995). On this front the attraction would have been to present *intuition* as a core part of Indian philosophy and associated closely with mystical experience and religious thought as opposed to Western science, which is said to be based on reason, logic, mathematics, and empirical evidence. There is some evidence, as will be seen, for this view to have been prevalent within classical Indian philosophy; however, it is not the only view of *intuition* to be found. On the other hand, there would also have been a desire on the part of some to make Indian philosophy somehow rigorous to Western minds by associating *intuition* with something familiar from mathematics and classical metaphysics. These two opposing streams have not had the same effect on Western receptions of classical Indian uses of *intuition*. Puligandla (1970) notes the tension in the discussion of the title of his paper, *Phenomenological Reduction and Yogic Meditation*.

The title of this paper will certainly strike some readers as strange and especially those who naively believe that it is a far cry from the Western rational philosophies to the Eastern mystical musings. But those who are familiar with both know that the former are no more entirely rational than the latter are entirely mystical. (1970: 19, emphasis added)

His discussion is focused on a comparison between *intuition* in Husserl’s phenomenology and *intuition* in Patañjali’s *Yoga-Sūtras*. However, the points he makes about *intuition* talk in the *Yoga-Sūtras* and Husserl’s discussion of transcendental phenomenology and the epoché are but only one locus for identifying similarities between Eastern and Western discussions of *intuition* talk. It is not only the Yoga school of classical Indian philosophy or the Advaita Vedānta school that has something to say about *intuition*. Rather all of the schools have something to say about *intuition*.

As O&H note in their introduction, *intuition* talk is often hard to tie down and move forward on because there are so many uses of the term. To ameliorate this difficulty and guide future research they provide a fascinating and extremely useful table of various uses of *intuition* in Western philosophy and other disciplines. Their table is not exhaustive of all uses of *intuition*, but it provides one with a strong foothold on some of the many different uses one can run across. Form a comparative point of view, it is important to point out, in contrast to the excellent table they provide, that Mohanty (1993a) also offers a table for contrasting differences between intuitive and non-intuitive knowledge.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intuitive knowledge</th>
<th>Non-intuitive knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Immediate awareness</td>
<td>1. Mediate knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The object is given</td>
<td>2. The object is constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The knowledge is non-conceptual</td>
<td>3. The knowledge is conceptual</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. The knowledge has absolute certainty</td>
<td>4. The knowledge may have only relative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>certainty</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. The knowledge is concrete</td>
<td>5. The knowledge is abstract</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. The knowledge is of the unique individual</td>
<td>6. The knowledge is of the general</td>
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<td>7. The knowledge is knowledge by identity</td>
<td>7. The knowledge is knowledge by difference</td>
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<td>8. The knowledge is disinterested</td>
<td>8. The knowledge is motivated</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. The knowledge is ecstatic awareness</td>
<td>9. The knowledge is detached cold and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>intellectual</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mohanty deploys his table for the purposes of discussing different uses of *intuition* cross-culturally. For example, he notes that while Kant’s conception of intuition would accept (1) and (2) under intuitive knowledge, it need not accept (5) and (6). By contrast, for a Buddhist thinker it is quite clear that what is known through *intuition* is the unique particular, which makes acceptance of (6) central. Later we will see how the Buddhist conception of *intuition* allows for the generation of a problem concerning *intuition* in relation to its proper objects that is similar to a problem found in Western discussions of *intuition* concerning mathematical and moral truths.

Finally, one might ask: why is there an absence of cross-cultural discussions of *intuition*? Perhaps the reason is that there has been a strong separation in 20th century Western philosophy between philosophy and religion. The strong separation between the two is largely due to the influence of logical positivism on 20th century Western philosophy. However, for the purposes of many philosophical topics, such as *intuition*, the separation between philosophy and religion has hindered potential growth in theorizing in much the same way that separating philosophy from science hinders growth in both philosophical and scientific theorizing. The experience of *intuition* is a phenomenon in the human condition. As a consequence, a comprehensive understanding of it must be generated through a reflective engagement across all areas of discourse in which it is treated.

**Classical Indian Pramāṇa Theory**

In classical Indian philosophy there are six orthodox schools and three heterodox schools. An orthodox school accepts the ultimate authority (*pramāṇya*) of the sacred texts known as the Vedas (*Srutī*), and a heterodox school rejects the ultimate authority of the Vedas (Bilimoria 2008a: 20–21, 294–6). Alongside *Srutī*, the contingent authority of sometimes 5 (plus or minus 1), means of knowing (and arriving at cognitions (*jñāna*), understandings, and beliefs, including moral
judgment), are widely accepted; namely, perception (pratyakṣa) (direct naïve cognition), inference (inductively deductive cognition) (anumāna), testimony (śabda, of which Śruti is the pinnacle), analogy (upamāna), and arthapatti (counterfactual presumption), to which cognition of absence (abhāva) (or 'non-perception', anupalabdhi) is also added. All schools of Indian philosophy discuss a particular kind of 'extraordinary' mental state,—we might class under 'anomalous cognition', or 'trans-sensory perception', which is variously called in Sanskrit terms: yogaja (literally, 'born of yoga', in shortened form, 'yogī') pratyakṣa, prajñā, pratibhā, ārṣṭāna, or siddhadārśana (the sight of the yogically-accomplished adept, much like the uncanny 'occulted vision' of the mystic). The core debate, in this context, is over whether yogaja-pratyakṣa is a pramāṇa, either as a stand-alone (sui generis) means of knowing or as an extension of one of the above pramāṇas. It is usually aligned with perception and inference. In other words, the core question is: Is yogic perception a means of acquiring knowledge about something, which is substantially distinct from other sources of knowledge either in the kind of things known or the way of knowing? Two schools, the Mīmāṃsā and the Cārvāka argue that it is not.6 The remaining seven argue that it is. However, some of the seven schools disagree over exactly how the mental state is an instrument of knowledge, what its fundamental nature is, and whether yogaja pratyakṣa, ārṣṭāna, pratibhā, and siddhadārśana should be thought of as being the same. Because of the immense literature on uses of *intuition* in classical Indian philosophy, we will focus our discussion on certain schools. And even when we are discussing certain schools we will only focus on specific figures within each school. Again, this work only aims to lay a foundation for future cross-cultural studies of *intuition*.

The Nyāya Theory

Within the eminent tradition of the Nyāya ('Reasoning') School of philosophy, stretching from its founder Akṣapāda Gautama to members of the Navya-Nyāya, the so-called New School, such as Udayana, Gāṅgeśa, Viśvanātha and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, there has been a great deal of discussion over a kind of perception called, extraordinary perception, EP.6 There are at least two different understandings of EP: the person-based and the universal-based. On the person-based model of EP, a perception is said to be extraordinary because of the kinds of things that the perception is directed at and because of the nature of the kind of person that can have such a perception. On the universal-based model of EP, a perception is said to be extraordinary because the kind of thing one is related to is itself extraordinary in some way. Thus, the main contrast between the two models revolves around whether it is the person or the kind of thing the person is said to be related to that is extraordinary.

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6Gautama, Nyāyasūtra (NS) (2.1.34: 497–8).
Yogaja-pratyakṣa on some accounts can be taken to be a multi-phase sensory perception that the yogin is capable of having. A yogin is also called—depending on the state of self-realization attained and as befits her transcendental stature—variously a *yukta* (one absorbed in continual *samādhi*-state), *vīyukta* or *kevalīn* (in a state of empiness or bereft of all conceptual cognitive content). So, in addition to cognizing particulars (entities, qualias, events in the ordinary order of things, with their respective universals imperceptibly inhering in and qualifying the object), the yogin has cultivated the higher capacity of perceiving those very *universals* as the property of 'sameness' (*śāmāṅya*), and a second-order *universal* of universals, which is knowledge of an even more special kind. There may even be a separate third-order perception that embeds a distinct knowledge of the categories of samenesses or modal universals (*dravya* substantives, propertied subsistences, and timeless events), unattached to any particulars, events or even classes. The knowledge of the infinite-expansive self, omniscience, liberation (*mokṣa*), *sunnām būnum* or *niḥśreyā*, would be four instances of this extraordinary *super-pramāṇa*.

To elaborate on the trope of the 'sameness of universals' a little further, we shall cite a couplet from the celebrated middle-Nyāya text, *Bhāṣā-Paricchedha*:

\[
\begin{align*}
alaukikastu vyāparastra√̄̅dhah pariśkritāt \\
saṃnyālayalakṣaṇo jñānalakṣaṇa yogajastāḥ (BP 63)
\end{align*}
\]

The text here speaks of three operational modalities, *vyāpara*, or conjuncts (i.e. of the mind with its object of awareness), in the case of 'extraordinary' perception (of the unusual type), namely, i) ones based on common features (*śāmāṅya*), ii) those based on knowledge (*jñānalakṣaṇa*), and those that arise from *yoga* (concentration). A word on the use of *vyāpara* is apposite: in Gautama’s time this was simply called ‘*sannikāraṇa*’, as in *indriyasannikāraṇa* (sense-organ contact), but because mind (*manas*) is only tendentiously a sense-organ (sixth sense), technically the operational feature of ‘conjunction’ is preferred, and its fitting object is, in the first modality, *saṃnyālayalakṣaṇo—lakṣaṇa* being the ‘structure of cognition’—*sameness* as a common generic feature, *prakāraṇa*, structuring the cognition. (Commentators, however, continued to use the term *sannikāraṇa*). This common feature or characteristic (*prakāra*) may cut across—or be a pervasive, therefore common, feature of—a number of substantive occurrences. So it is not just *śāmāṅya as jāti* (e.g. natural kind universals or real universals in Lockean-Kripkean distinction forged over nominal universals), or smokeness in seeing smoke bellowing from wood-fired stove, with which the sense-organ has direct contact, but the association of *this* smokeness to *all* instances of smoke and smoky things generically, remembered, portended, or predicted, and otherwise. This is what is said to be critical here: this hypergeneric coordinate is the conjunct in the cognition: *saṃnyālayalakṣaṇa*; what one cognizes is the substantive sameness of the feature of 'smoke' across a number of instantiations. An analogy may be drawn with the 'type-token' distinction, in as much as, for example, a dollar coin can be substituted for a dollar note, or if soiled.

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²*Bhāṣā-Paricchedha (BP) 65: yogaja dvividehāḥ prakto yukta-yuḥjānabhedāh.*
yet another dollar note, because what each has in common is the same value (hence the class or ‘type’) of a dollar in the nation’s assigned currency. The tenderer does not have a direct sense-connection with the ‘value’ but this is inherently there (samavāya) in the transactional act.

The second modality is with respect to the decisive knowledge (jñāna) of that ‘sameness’ as being possessed by such-and-such a substantive (smokiness to smoke); the text seems to be keen on emphasizing that there is a separate connection that is being made between seeing smokiness (as feature) across numerous instances of smokiness and the second-order knowledge that these are features of ‘smoke’; otherwise there would be no connection of ‘sameness’ (as ubiquitousness) in seeing smoke in the kitchen and seeing smoke at a distance when there is fire on the mountain; so this is a special conjunct the mind achieves with respect to something as simple as the presence of smoke in place k and then again in place m. Nyāya considers this function of the mind that knows smoke by knowing the connection based on common feature to be somehow ‘extra-ordinary’. Nothing here is said about the knowledge of the object as such that possesses smoke, for recall the definition is directed at working through the limits of laksana, i.e. the phenomenology of the cognition of the universals.

The third operational modality is with respect to yoga, where by concentration (aided by meditation), the accomplished yogi is able to have (come to possess) knowledge of every sameness, hence universal, universal of universals, and everything that could possibly or modally be connected with these universals; in fact a highly attained or enlightenment yogi is said to be always connected with the knowledge of substantives in all possible worlds, and thereby with everything that there is to know: yuktasya sarvadā bhānam, chintāsahakrto’parah (BP 66). The yuka doesn’t have to know each and every individual thing (which is not a requirement of omniscience so understood); and furthermore, it follows that the last part of the claim here blocks the skeptic’s doubt or question: how does one know that one knows everything? It suffices that there is virtual connection through the knowledge of universals, and the overarching universals, the arche, etc.

Thus, to summarize the contrast: on the universal-based model of EP, a perception is said to be extraordinary because it involves an ordinary sensory connection to something, a universal, which is extraordinary, because when one is appropriately connected to the universal by a sensory connection, they are through the nature of universals, also connected to all prior and future instances of the universal. Sāmānyalaksanapratyavaksa means universal-based sensory connection. By contrast, as Das (2002) characterizes the person-based model we get the following:

The Naiyāyikas hold that the supernormal perception of an individual, i.e., a yogin is also as real as any other perception. They call such a perception a supernormal one, for such perceptions are beyond the range of normal perception. They can perceive the subtle objects, atoms, and minds of others, air space, time, etc. through this perception. Jayanta Bhatta\(^8\) describes yogic perception as the perception of subtle, hidden, remote, past, and

\(^8\)NM: 95.
future objects and considers it to be the highest excellence of human perception. And he rejoins that yogins perceive all objects in all places through cognition simultaneously. The supernormal state of mind acts as the supernormal sense-object contact (alaukika sannikarṣa). This type of contact is known as yogaja sannikarṣa which causes yogaja pratyakṣa. (Das 2002: 419-420).

The core account of intuition under the person-based model of EP is that intuition is a form of supernormal perception, a kind of perception where one’s normal perceptual capacities are enhanced so as to allow one to intuit the past and the future, subtle things, elusive things, imperceptible (adrṣṭa) traces of entities and events receded in time, and even remote entities or events (mapped or divinized non-inferentially through portending traces). Of course, one might simply ask: how can the mind make contact with future objects or events, decidedly elusive, i.e. of the adṛṣṭa category, so as to have supernormal perception of them? Here it is interesting to note that the Nyāya do not hold that *intuition* requires contact, rather they hold that the supernormal overall state of the mind is sufficient to generate the intuition. In normal perception the sense comes into contact (indriyasaṁnikarṣa) with the objects that are thereby what is perceived by the knower. However, in *intuition*, it is because the mind is in a supernormal state that it can deliver *intuitions* that have elements that are (i) about the past, (ii) about the future, (iii) about entities that are remote in space, (iv) entities that are very subtle, like air, and perhaps even (v) partially occluded or hidden. The form of contact here is called samyuktasaṁyoga-sannikarṣa: a presentification (literally, transcendental conjunct) of the noesis with its intentional sameness, the noeta, outside, as we described in the instance of the grasping of universals above.

In that sense, one could say that yogaja-pratyakṣa embeds a trans-sensory cognition, for the mind (manas) that is said to be vibhu or extensionally pervasive and which comes directly into contact with or has phenomenal access to an elusive object (such as a receded entity or a yet-to-be event, the universals (jati or akṛti) embedding or inhering in a particular, and its sameness or simulation to the class of universals (sāmānyā) to which this belongs in a higher order universal, sāmānyalakṣanā) which normally, and normatively, falls outside the range and scope of the extended senses and the deducing mind.11 This implies that the mind extends

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9SM: 63.
10āsattirādrṣyānām tu sāmānyajñānamimizyate
tadindriyāja-taddharmabodhasāmkṛtyaapekṣyate (BP 64)

Here it said that the awareness of the generic sameness structure is identified as the conjunct (āsati, pratyāsati) with the support-base (substratum) to which the particulars are associated. The complete conmeasurement involved in the perception correlative to the indriya, sense instrument, is the unmitigated condition. (That is, the eye, the radiance, the mind, generic features, and contact, etc., must all be involved in this awareness-generation as well, to rule out any possibility of simple abstractions and conceptual elopements).
11BP 65 Viśyā yasya tasyaiṣa vyāpārao jñānalakṣanāḥ. (also SM 64, p. 342) This verse underscores the facticity of the knowledge of the specific, unique and unusual universal as the transacting connection in the cognitive episode with its object cognized and via this connection mutatis mutandis knowledge of all object-substrate that possess this universal. A question is discussed in
beyond its ordinary capabilities to reach out in multiphase to regions of the world not accessible to the regular functions of the senses. What is being suggested is that the so-cultivated mind as a ‘sixth + sense’, or *sensus communis* (in Aristotelian terms), takes over and extends in time and space to categories of understanding that exceed the epistemic mediating-bounds of the senses and registers a knowing (*jñānagrahaka*) in the non-constraining epistemic environment. This, in brief, is then the phenomenology of *yogaja-pratyakṣa*. Hence, in this regard *yogaja-pratyakṣa* is both extraordinary and trans-sensory, or even ‘extra-sensorial’; Stephen Phillips elsewhere has christened this uniquely peculiar transcendental ‘a/perception’ (*alaukika-caksu*) or ‘extra-extrospection’ following Matilal’s ‘mystical empiricism’.12

Chakrabarti (2010), extending the cognition to *anumāna* or inference—in as much as inference embeds perception, and may implicate yogi-derived percepts—offers another rendering of the *universal*-based account of EP. In order to understand the *universal*-based account it is instructive to consider how one could be justified in believing the conclusion of the following argument, called SH:

There is a fire on the hill over there; because I can see smoke above the hill over there; and wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as when I am in my kitchen cooking.

The conclusion of this argument is that there is a fire on the hill over there. The core premises are: (i) *I can see smoke above the hill over there* and (ii) *wherever there is smoke, there is fire*. However, while it is clear that one can use perception to gain knowledge of the presence of smoke above a hill, which is stated in premise (i), one must, in general, ask: how can one know (ii) that wherever there is smoke there is fire? The Nyāya maintain that the only way one can know such a claim is through *extraordinary perception*. Their reason for doing so is that the truth of such a claim requires grasping the universal *fire* and the universal *smoke* and understanding the special relation (*vyāpti*) between them, or the connectivity of aligned universals. In general one cannot infer from a finite set of observations of the absence of fire and the absence of smoke, and the presence of fire and the presence of smoke, that wherever there is smoke there is fire. A finite sample of co-variation

the commentaries: but how can you say such one knows all the smokes and fires, when these are not there; and is he therefore omniscient? The answer is smokes and fires do not have to be eternally present (somethings do), and what is known is not in any great detail, so no claims to omniscient in this condition is being emphasized. There are two further steps before this claim is possible, as described earlier.

12Phillips 1996: 175–8, Bilimoria (2011), but Matilal did not use this appellation as an endorsement but rather as a caricature of the position; he was a through-and-through realist and argued for the inclusion of universals within the operational features of ordinary perception (consistent with his direct realism thesis); in that regard Matilal’s non-nominalist view is the same as Jayanta Bhatta’s on the direct perception of universals, but misses the further thesis of universals of universals, and unattached *sāmiṇyā* (such as God’s supreme knowledge and his over-arching bliss-state, *ananda*). See Matilal *Perception*, p. 424 on ultimate real universals and their assimilation; while for Kant universals are known a priori; for Aristotle they are grounded in the physical, in Nyāya it is mixed up by a relation of inference (*samatvīya*).
of absence and presence of x and y cannot provide justification for the universal claim. On the universal-based model of EP the following occurs:

1. S has an ordinary sensory perception of a particular P.
2. When S has an ordinary sensory perception of a particular P, they also have an ordinary sensory perception of a universal U present in P. For example, when Renu perceives a cow before her in the pasture, Renu has a sensory connection through her ordinary perception of the universal cowness present in the cow before her.
3. A universal that is wholly present in a particular P has an extraordinary property: what one comes to know of it in a particular extends to all instances of the universal, past, present, and future.
4. So, by (1)–(3) S can have an extraordinary perception of what is true of all of the instances of a universal U simply by having an ordinary sensory perception of a particular P in which U is present.

We might further understand this kind of perception by looking at two points about it. First, does Nyāya philosophy take EP on the universal-based model to be a regular kind of perception stemming from the six features of mind it recognizes, the five senses and the unified manas? Chakrabarti notes that the answer is ‘yes’, and it might be further noted that in giving this answer about the nature of EP, it follows that extraordinary perception on the universal-based model is not the function of an extra sensory capacity, that is a capacity in addition to the six recognized sense functions. Second, it appears that universal-based perception is not the only kind of extraordinary perception for the Nyāya. In addition to universal-based perception, there is also perception of absence, or negative entities. Whenever one has a perception of absence, one has an extraordinary perception. Thus, the category of ‘extraordinary perception’ is investigated by the Nyāya in general.

The Vaiśeṣika Theory

Praśastapāda is one of the core contributors to the Vaiśeṣika School of Philosophy. Ārṣijñāna (ṛsi-cognition) is one of the four kinds ofvidyā (knowledge), some Indian philosophers treat it as being a state that is similar to yogi-pratyakṣa (yogic perception) and Siddhadarśana (siddhiic vision). Sjödin (2012) provides a delineation and discussion of Praśastapāda’s account of the distinction between the three states in his Praśastapādabhāṣya:

Yogi-pratyakṣa: Y-cognition

But for the yogis, different from us, who are yuktas, arises through the inner sense assisted by merit born from yoga, a correct vision of the own nature of their own self, [the self] of others, aksa, space, time, wind, atoms, inner sense [and] the qualities, motions, generalities, [and] particularities inherent in these [substances] and of inference itself. For the one who are viyuktas then, arises perception of the subtle, concealed and remote, by means of the fourfold contact when assisted by merits born from yoga. (Sjödin 2012: 473)
Siddhadarśana: S-cognition

Siddhic vision is not a distinct (i.e. another) cognition. Why?

This vision, which is preceded by effort [and] concerns subtle, concealed and remote objects visible to seers who are accomplished in [the practice of] eye and feet-ointment, the sword and globule, is just perception. Furthermore, the [distinctness of the] valid vision of matured merit and demerit of sentient beings in heaven, atmosphere and on earth, [being] grounded in the movement of the planets and stars, is just inferential. Furthermore, the [distinctness of the] valid vision of merit etc. [which is] independent of an inferential mark, is just included in either perception or rśi cognition. (Sjōdin 2012: 474)

Āraṇajñāṇa: A-cognition

For the rśis, the ones who arrange the transmitted, arises a cognition which is a presentation of the object as it is and which is appearing. [The cognition] arises from a contact between self and inner sense and from specific merit. [The cognition] is of past, future and present objects beyond the senses, like merit etc., [and of objects] discussed and not discussed in texts. This [cognition] is said to be “rśic”. Though this generally [occurs] for heavenly rśis [it occurs] sometimes for worldly beings as well. Like in the case of a girl who says: -My heart tells me that my brother will come tomorrow. (Sjōdin 2012: 477)

According to Sjōdin’s account of Praśastapāda theory, S-cognitions are not distinct from Y-cognitions because they are simply a form of perception. A-cognitions, by contrast, are distinct from Y-cognitions and S-cognitions because (i) A-cognitions involve the apprehension and presentation of an object as it is, (ii) they arise because of a peculiar merit on the part of the subject of the cognition, and (iii) they involve contact between the (manas) mind and the (ātman) self. On this account an *intuition* is a presentation of an object as it is due to a contact between the mind of the subject and the self of the subject that is a product of some kind of merit on the part of the subject. The merit comes from a practice that improves one’s capacity to have A-cognitions. The notion of merit is not the kind of merit that is innate or due to a person’s heritage. Rather, just as Y-cognition is a function of yogic practices, A-cognition is a function of a practice as well. It is merit that is a contributing cause to the production of an A-cognition. The merit derives from a practice that involves some components of yogic practice, but not all of them. In addition, it is important to note that A-cognitions are a form of pratiṣṭha, which means “shine forth”; “shine upon”, “come in sight”, “appear to”, and “burst forward”. They have a strong presentational phenomenology. The word is typically translated as, “an instantaneous flash of insight or intuition”. And by some, such as Bhartṛhari, it is articulated as the immediate understanding of sentences in one’s own language whereby something is presented before the self as being self-evident.13

Finally, concerning rśi-cognition the key questions are: is it taken to be a form of knowledge? Is it a form of knowledge that is reducible to another form of knowledge, such as perception, inference, or testimony? The answers to these

13See Sjōdin (2012: 479–481) for discussion of these points; Bilimoria on sphoja-pratibha in Bhartṛhari’s linguistics (2008a: 18, 63, 96–8, 308).
questions are not uniform. However, it is clear that at least some philosophers hold that āśi-cognition is a distinct category of knowledge, which is not generated from either a process of perception, a process of inference or verbal testimony. Moreover, it is a distinct kind of pramāṇa. The Profile for A-cognition is the following:

1. A-cognitions are caused by a merit that is not identical to yogic practice.
2. A-cognitions are not sensual/perceptual because there is no contact between the sense organs and the relevant object.
3. The experience of A-cognition is non-volitional. The subject does not try to have an A-cognition.

A Buddhist Theory

Dharmakārtti is one of the founding members of the Dignāga-Dharmakārtti school of Buddhist philosophy. He discusses yogaja-pratyakṣa in his Pramāṇavārttika (PV), the chapter on perception (PV3), the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin), and the Nyāya-bindu. J. Dunne (2006) offers the following characterization of the central components of Dharmakārtti’s account:

1. A yogic perception is a cognition induced by a meditative practice (bhāvana) (PV3.281; PVin1.28). The types of practice in question are ones that build to a “culmination” (pariniṣpati) (PV3.285 = PVin 1.31). Specifically, these practices begin with learning about some object or idea, then contemplating it in a manner that involves reasoning; finally, one engages in the meditative practice itself, and when that practice reaches its culmination, a yogic perception will result (PVin ad 1.28).
2. The cognition that results from this type of process is vivid or clear (PV3.281 and PVin1.28 and 31); that is, the object appears with the same degree of vividness that accompanies cognitions involving sensory contact, as when an object is directly in front of one (PV3.282 = PVin1.29). This is indicated by the fact that, when persons have this type of cognition they react in an alert or excited manner that is absent when they believe themselves to be simply inferring or thinking of something that they do not take to be directly present (PVin1.30).
3. A yogic perception is similar to cognitions that occur when, for example, a person overtaken by grief repeatedly thinks of the departed person and eventually hallucinates that person’s presence, or when an adept visualizes a colored disc and eventually sees it with complete vividness (PV3.282 = PVin1.29).
4. All cognitions of this kind—whether induced by meditation or by states such as grief—appear vividly; therefore they are not conceptual, since a conceptual cognition cannot present its content vividly (PV3.284ab = PVin1.32ab).
5. Although a yogic perception is induced by a process similar to hallucination, it is distinct from hallucinatory cognitions because the object of yogic perception
is “true” or “real” (bhūta/sadbhūta), whereas hallucinations have “false” or “unreal” objects (abhūta/asadbhūta). The only specific yogic objects mentioned are the Noble Truths (as is strongly implied by PV 3.281 and 285, and is explicitly stated in PV in ad 1.28).

6. A yogic perception is trustworthy (samvādī), and it is a reliable cognition (pramāṇa) (PV 3.286).

Dunne goes on to point out that Dharmakīrti’s comparison of yogic perception with hallucination is intended to show that on Dharmakīrti’s theory yogic perception should not be thought of as some kind of mystical experience. It is not presented as a mystical experience, and it is argued to be non-analogous with mystical experience. Rather, the process is, “designed to inculcate transformative concepts into the mind through an intense, vivid and non-conceptual experience that arises from learning, contemplating and meditating on those concepts Dunne (2006: 499).”

A core component of the Buddhist view that puts it in strong contrast with the Nyāya view is the disagreement between the two schools over the status of universals. The Buddhist denies that universals are ultimately real. They deny this on the following grounds: only what is causally efficacious really exists, universals, unlike particulars, are not causally efficacious, since universals cannot change; so universals cannot really exist. The Nyāya by contrast holds that universals truly do exist in the objects that we have a causal connection to, and that by coming into contact with them it is possible for us to have certain kinds of extraordinary perception. It is clear from the disagreement between the two schools on universals that the underlying theory of yogaja-pratyakṣa cannot be the same.

An important consequence of the Buddhist view of universals, according to Dunne, is that if yogic perception is a real kind of perception, then the objects it engages cannot be universals but must be particulars, since only the latter are ultimately real. However, as Dunne points out, Dharmakīrti does not delimit the scope of yogic perception to particulars. Rather, he opens it up to universals, such as impermanence (anityatā) and emptiness (śūnyatā), as well as the to realization of the four noble truths.

Concerning yogic perception Dharmakīrti says that it is:

A trustworthy awareness that appears vividly by the force of meditation – similar to cases such as the fear [induced by something seen in a dream] –is a perception; it is non-conceptual [PV in 1.28] (Dunne 2006: 507).

[Some] adepts, having apprehended objects (arha) through cognition (jñāna) born of learning, and having established those objects through reason and a cognition born of contemplation, then meditatively cultivate [a realization of] those objects. When that meditation reaches its culmination, those adepts have a cognition with a vivid appearance, as in the case of fear [induced by a dream]. The adept’s cognition is a perception that is a reliable awareness (pramāṇa); it is nonconceptual and has a non-erroneous object. That reliable perception is, for example, the seeing of the Noble Truths (āryasatyadarsana), as I explained in the Pramāṇavārttika. (Dunne 2006: 507).
Finally, as Dunne does, it will be useful to contrast Dharmakirti's account of yogic perception with the view expressed by Vasubandhu on grasping the Four Noble Truths. Dunne provides two important passages from Vasubandhu:

One who wishes to see the Truths from the beginning guards his ethical conduct. He then studies the teachings (śruta) that are conducive to seeing the Truths (sativadaśrṣṇa), or he listens to teachings about their meaning. Having studied or listened, he contemplates. And having correctly contemplated, he applies himself to meditative cultivation. In a state of meditative concentration (samādhi), in him arises the contemplation-born discernment on the basis of his study-born discernment. And on the basis of his contemplation-born discernment, the cultivation born discernment arises in him. (Dunne 2006: 508).

The study-born [discernment] is a definitive determination (niścaya) that arises from the reliability of a trusted person's statements (aptavacca-na-pramāṇa-jāto). The contemplation-born arises from meditative concentration (samādhiṣṭa)... (Dunne 2006: 508).

The general idea advanced by both thinkers is that yogic perception is the consequence of progression. The progression begins with a linguistically derived conceptual understanding, which is followed by a rationally derived conceptual understanding; the final culmination is a meditatively induced non-conceptual state that is vivid. However, to critically examine this state we might legitimately ask, what could this state be about, given the standard Buddhist rejection of universals?

To see a potential problem consider the Truth of Suffering that is an explicit object of yogic perception for Dharmakirti, as well as other Buddhist thinkers.

1. To realize the Truth of Suffering, one must realize the impermanence of everything, since the impermanence of everything is part of what constitutes the Truth of Suffering by being a cause of suffering for each thing that does suffer.
2. The impermanence of everything is not something over and above all things that are particular and impermanent. There is no real universal of impermanence, which everything participates in. Rather, impermanence is abstracted from the particular impermanence that each and every thing undergoes.
3. Yogic perception, being a perception, is only of particular things that can be causally efficacious in the production of an image in the mind.
4. So, it cannot be that in having a yogic perception of the Truth of Suffering one is put into contact with the universal impermanence.

The problem that Dunne draws out here is extremely important from a cross-cultural point of view. In our comparative examination we will show how this problem within Buddhist epistemology and metaphysics concerning "intuition" and its objects can be brought into contact with a well known problem in the philosophy of mathematics that extends to theories of how we can know moral truths.
The Yoga Theory

Patañjali is considered the founder of the Yoga School of Philosophy. His Yoga-Sūtra is considered the central text of the Yoga School. Puligandla (1970) describes Patañjali’s view of intuition as follows:

The three stages, dhārana’, dhyāna’, and samādhi, taken together constitute what Patañjali calls the sāmyama. According to [him], at the samādhi state the subject is freed from the brain-bound intellect and acquires intuition, known as buddhi or prajñā. It is through this intuition that the yogi grasps the subtler and profounder aspects of objects in the manifested universe.

Sāmiyama can be preformed on any object whatever and knowledge of it at different levels can be obtained. Thus Patañjali classifies knowledge as śabda, artha, and jñāna. śabda is knowledge based on words alone. Artha is the knowledge which the yogi seeks, the true knowledge of any object whatever as grasped by intuition in the samādhi state. Jñāna is knowledge based on perception and reasoning, under which come all empirical sciences. Patañjali also distinguishes between saṃvārka and nirvārka samādhi stages. In the former, the separation of knowledge into the above three kinds takes place; in the latter, which is the culmination of the sāmiyama, the pure, real, internal knowledge regarding the object is obtained and the yogi then knows the real object by making the mind one with it. (1970: 25).

The knowledge obtained through yogic meditation is not to be confused with ordinary kinds of knowledge, for instance, common sense and scientific knowledge. The latter are always based on pre-suppositions which cannot be validated within the disciplines themselves. Thus, Patañjali says that “The knowledge based on inference or testimony is different from direct knowledge obtained in the higher states of consciousness because it (the former) is confined to a particular object or aspect. (1970: 25)

To unpack the theory of intuition that Patañjali offers one must look carefully, as Puligandla does, at the notions of dhārana’, dhyāna’, and samādhi that constitute sāmiyama. Yogic meditation as a source of intuition requires.14

1. Engaging in certain physical and mental practices known as the five aṅgas of yoga. The first two yama, niyama, are intended to eliminate distractions arising from uncontrolled desires and emotions. The second two, āsana, prāṇāyāma, are intended to eliminate disturbances arising from the physical body. The last, pratyāhāra, aims to prepare the mind for concentration by isolating the sense organs from the mind.

2. Engaging in certain meditative practices that prepare the mind for having a genuine intuition. Dhārana is concentration. For Patañjali, “concentration is the confining of the mind within a limited mental area.” In the dhārana stage the aim is to keep the mind continuously engaged in the consideration of one object, and to bring it back to that object if it wanders. Dhāryāna is the uninterrupted flow (of the mind) toward the object (chosen for meditation). It is contemplation of an entity. This stage is reached only when a practitioner can hold their mind on a single object without any fluctuation. Samādhi occurs when there is only

consciousness of the object of meditation and not of the mind itself. The point of samādhi as a distinct state is that it enables one to remove a final distraction in the contemplation of an object: awareness of the self. In dhyāna one has complete concentration on the object, but one also has awareness of the self. In samādhi one removes awareness of the self.

3. According to Patañjali every manifestation has two forms: rūpa and svārūpa. The first is the inessential form and the latter is the essential form. In the transition from dharana to samādhi the svārūpa moves from being present in the background of one’s consideration to disappearing completely as one’s concentration on the object of contemplation increases.

4. In samādhi there is a fusion of subject and object. The fusion can be compared to that of the experience of flow when dancing. The dancer-dance distinction drops out for the dancer. Similarly, the contemplation of the object brought upon by the concentration of the subject leads to a loss of an awareness of the self in the concentration.

A most spectacular exemplification of the kind of luminously heightened perception that an adept steeped in yoga is capable of having, through her awakened yogic-epistemic capacities as per the Yoga-sūtras, occurs in (at least) two Books of the grand epic of the Mahābhārata. The first is reported in the celebrated Bhagavadgītā (BhG), where after hearing Krishna’s detailed theory on the metaphysics of yoga (of various kinds), his bewildered warrior-friend Arjuna is moved to ask: what would one come to know at end of the practice of the yogas? Since it would be premature to presume that the amateur Arjuna could already ‘be there’, Krishna grants him an unusual gift: the momentary boon of divyacaksu, ‘divine vision’, so that he could have a fore-taste at least of the immense knowledge the yogic process is capable of unleashing.15 There follows an account of an epiphenous experience that Arjuna has wherein he reports seeing a thousand suns culminating in intense radiance; gloriously encircling planets, galaxies and universes; bursting forth of energies and light-rays whose colors and playful swirling in curved spaces defy ordinary linear experience; time that stretches across infinite and parallel and spherical ranges, and renders all beings dead and extinct in eons ahead, but as if in the next moment, and more. Arjuna is so overwhelmed by this magnificent vision, unable to bear or understand its intensity fully, that he asks Krishna to return him to ordinary everyday perception. Krishna here would be identified as the super-yukta, and Arjuna as the aspiring-practicing yogi (were he to take a leaf from this theophanic experience and undertake upon himself the enjoined praxis).

The second episode occurs in the Book of Women following the ‘Dead of Night’ assault on the battlefield by one side of the cousin-brothers upon the other claimants to the sovereignty of the kingdom, which leads to a most horrific carnage, of the brutal deaths of the valiant commanders and fighters on both side of the warring clan. In the morning, the women, mothers, wives, daughters, mother-in-laws, sisters, and female mendicants arrive at the unsettling scene. The grand matriarch,

15Chapter 11, The Bhagavadgītā.in the Mahābhārata.
Gāndharī, is endowed on spot by Krishna with a ‘moral intuition’, an extraordinary vision that is enabled by certain divinely-endowed yogic-eyes (divyena cakṣusā), so that she could survey without breaking down in intolerable grief the full extent of the carnage that now defines the battlefield, and hence also gives expression to the moral improbity of the situation juxtaposed with the shocking grief of the women-in-tow. The description she is able to provide is a masterpiece of the work of pathos and empathy: ‘Look at the array of widows, bewildered daughter-in-laws, newly-betrothed brides running hither and thither, with their braided hair down, soaking in the blood of their loved ones, some also looking for the heads severed from their fallen husbands. The jackals are out in daylight indifferent to this human noise, gnawing at every limb which only a few moon-nights before in deep conjugal embrace triggered many a pleasurable sensation to their beloved now distraught wives, screeching to the winds: How could this be—this pitiful slaughter? Whose dharma, whose justice’\(^{16}\)

The Mīmāṁśa Critique

The Mīmāṁśa School of philosophy, like the Cārvāka, does not accept yogajapratyakṣa as a form of knowledge. However, the Cārvāka School only accepts normal sensory perception. They deny testimony, inference, memory, and all other commonly discussed potential pramāṇa. By contrast, the Mīmāṁśa are more liberal in the sources they accept. Perception, testimony, and inference are all acceptable, while memory and yogic perception are not. At least one argument they offer against yogic perception is, what we will call the exclusion-by-reduction argument.

Exclusion-by-Reduction Argument:

1. Yogic perception is an intuition that is the product of a sustained practice of meditation. The intuition that is produced through a sustained practice of meditation is a presentational flash of insight that is information bearing.

2. The information presented by an intuition either makes reference only to an event in the past that involved perception or testimony about something or the intuition presents itself as being about something more than that which has occurred in the past. What need is there for intuition?

3. If it apprehends something that is just about the past, then it is not distinct from what is found in memory. And since memory is invalid, intuition is invalid.

4. If it apprehends something more than that which was perceived in the past, then it is illusory, since it apprehends something that is non-existent.

So, yogic intuition is invalid either because it reduces to memory of prior knowledge or because what it purports to be about is illusory. Das (2002) notes that

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there are three additional reasons why the Mīmāṃsā do not recognize yogic perception as a source of knowledge.\textsuperscript{17}

1. Sense organs by their nature have limitations. While it is true that the power of the sense organs can be increased by practice, there would appear to be a limit to what they can access.

2. While it is true that the power of a particular sense faculty can be increased, it is not true that a yogin that practices can see everything with his eyes. For example, his eyes cannot reveal sound nor his ears reveal color.

3. Although a person can possess a superior power of vision, the superior power of vision can only be applied to visible objects. Dharma is not visible, and is only knowable through the study of the Vedic texts. Thus, it cannot be the object of perception.

The 8th century doyen of the Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, was quite adamant that all perceptions involve a particular kind of contact, which is proper only to that perception, and he called this operational feature samprajñā in contrast to the saṁnikarśa of the Nyāya. Indeed, he averred that ‘contact’ might not be the correct description of what transpires when an object comes into the vicinity of a sense-organ, but more like what the Buddhist protagonists also have in mind: an operational presentation at a distance. The brunt of the argument is that there cannot be perception without the saṁyoga of the sense-organ with its proper object given in its field: the mind, which by extension is a sense-instrument, is not in a position to, or has the capability of circumventing this process and ‘grasping’ the object (jñānagrāhaka) through some other, altered, state of consciousness. If that were the case, then inference and testimony would also involve this inexplicable perceptual knowledge, which would absurdly render inference and testimony otiose and reductively redundant. There would then be no need of the other pramāṇas as the so-called yogi-pratyakṣa or extraordinary perception would yield knowledge of matters esoteric (such as dharma or moral imperatives, and the exact size of the apūrva or deferred imperceptible potentiā resulting from the māṇtric-effect of sacrifices and proportionate fruits (phalas) that can be expected).\textsuperscript{18} This would go against the grain of the received tradition and the indispensability of Śruti in such transcendental matters. While he agrees with the Nyāya view that universals are perceived, he does not believe universals bear an ‘inference’ relation (samanāya) to their objects but are rather identical (tādāmya) with them, and so he argues that what the Nyāya call (the further epistemic step of) sāmānya, ‘sameness’ is not something whose knowing requires a supernormal capacity but is instead a matter of inference: by observing smoke in its various occurrences (k, l, m, etc.) we infer that it is the same smokeness that pervades each of these instances. This is

\textsuperscript{17}See Das (2002: 422). Das is of course, summarizing a rather barbed polemical discussion that the doyen of Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa presents in his eminent work, notably the Ślokāvārtika (Pratyakṣāstrikā I. 53, 63–111).

\textsuperscript{18}See Bilimoria (2014).
consistent with common sense understanding. Kumārila even denies that the understanding of the concomitant relation between two universals that is drawn upon in inference—the vyāpī—is a product of supersensuous or extraordinary perception, but rather a generalized conjunct of two perceived instantiations of a general (natural) kind (for which ākṛti rather than jāti is preferred), thus:

\[
\text{smoke} \rightarrow \text{smokiness} + \text{freeness} \rightarrow \text{fire}
\]

It follows that there is nothing elusively mysterious or mystical about perception of particulars or of composite perceptions (in inference), accumulative perceptions (in testimony), inverse counterfactuals (in presumption) and perception of absence (abhāva).

### Comparative and Constructive Commentary

It is now time to return to the central question that this essay began with:

**CQI:** What can we learn about intuition, and how can our understanding of the purported phenomenon of knowledge by intuition be enhanced through a cross-cultural philosophical investigation of it?

We believe that there are two kinds of things one can learn from a cross-cultural investigation. On the one hand, one can learn what similarities and dissimilarities there are between different theories of *intuition* as found in different cultures. On the other hand, one can discover how a theory from one tradition might suffer from a cognitive blind spot by looking at other traditions. Our hope is that the cross-cultural-constructive engagement we will provide lays the foundation for future comparative studies. As an entry point into the discussion we will present a core question and a set core dimension questions for theorizing comparatively about uses of *intuition*, as well as a brief explanation of them. From that point forward we will move into an examination of each with respect to the literature on moral philosophy, the philosophy of mathematics, and/or classical Indian philosophy.

The core question that drives a cross-cultural and multi-disciplinary investigation into *intuition* is the common kind question.

**CK:** Is there a common kind of experience that falls under the various uses and theories of *intuition* found in (1)-(5).?

The answer to CK itself depends on how a theorist aims to identify two mental states as falling under a common kind. There are at least two approaches one can take. The phenomenological approach maintains that two mental states fall under a common kind when and only when they share a common type of phenomenology at

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19 See Bilimoria 2008b, Part II Abhāva, and Anupalabdhi.
20 CK can be expanded so that the question is about uses found outside the present essay.
the appropriate level of description. For example, a pain in my toe and a pain in my finger, though being distinct, both fall under the kind *pain* in virtue of the fact that at the appropriate level of description, they share a sufficiently similar phenomenology. While the locations of the two pains are different, and their intensity is different, their phenomenological similarity is strong. The *teleological approach* maintains that two mental states fall under a common kind when and only when they are the output of a common type of process. For example, an auditory perception and a visual perception, though being products of distinct processes, both fall under the kind *perceptual process* in virtue of the fact that at the appropriate level of description the processes that underlie them have a shared purpose: the acquisition of information. This shared, higher-type level, process can be contrasted against another process, such as making a decision about what to do, under which decision-making or choosing what to do would fail. It is an open question whether or not phenomenological ways of individuating mental states track teleological ways of individuating those same states. It is also a further question how the phenomenological and teleological approaches relate to the physical states that realize/cause the process and deliver the phenomenology.

A *common kind* theorist will maintain, regardless of whether the phenomenological or the teleological approach is taken, that the various uses of *intuition* found in classical Indian philosophy form a common kind. A *non-common kind* theorist will hold, for example, that although the experience of having an *intuition* across the various uses of *intuition* has a common phenomenology, that common phenomenology is not picking out a common kind at the relevant level of explanation. An analogy that can offer guidance here is the case of Jadeite and Nephrite. Although the two gems look macroscopically similar they are in fact distinct gems because of their underlying microscopic differences. The key point is that microscopic individualization is what matters, and not macroscopic resemblance. Similarly, a non-common kind theorist might maintain, for example, that although the Buddhist theory of *intuition* and the Nyāya theory of *intuition* share a common phenomenology, these uses of *intuition* don’t pick out a common kind at a lower level of description.

In order to get traction on whether two or more theories of *intuition* might have common features or disparate features one must dig deeper into precise questions that can capture specific components on which one use of *intuition* might differ from another use of *intuition*. Here we provide a partial battery of questions that can be used to help capture how and when two or more uses of *intuition* are similar, and in what respect precisely they are similar or different. Where $I$ stands for a gives use of *intuition* on a specific theory there are six main dimension questions:

1. **Dimension Questions:**

   (i) Given a use of intuition $I$, what are the *proper objects* that $I$ is directed towards?

   (ii) Given a use of intuition $I$, what is the *phenomenal nature* of $I$?
(iii) Given a use of intuition I, what process or processes account for I?
(iv) Given a use of intuition I, is I a source of justification?
(v) Given a use of intuition I, is I a source of knowledge?
(vi) Given a use of intuition I, is the proper deployment or reception of I dependent on training or practice?

Concerning (i) it is important to begin analyzing a theory of intuition by trying to determine what the theory says are the proper objects of *intuition*. For it is possible that two theories of *intuition* maintain that the proper objects of *intuition* are distinct. In general, a theory of *intuition* could maintain that *intuitions* are only directed at mathematical truths, moral truths, philosophical truths, temporal truths (i.e. truths about the future, the past, or the present), particulars, universals, or a number of other entities. However, it is important to note that just because two uses of *intuition* differ in the objects they are said to be about, for example mathematical as opposed to moral truths, it does not follow that the two uses are non-convergent. Two or more uses of *intuition* are convergent when the theories presenting *intuition* are explicitly set over distinct objects, but because of the remainder of the structure of the theories of *intuition* the two theories could be extended to cover the remaining objects. For example, one theory might hold that *intuition* is about universals, while another theory says it is about moral truths, yet when one looks at the overall structure of the two theories there is no principled reason why the theory concerning universals could not be extended to cover moral truths, and the moral theory could not be extended to cover truths about universals. Moreover, the proper objects of two distinct theories of *intuition* need to be identified for the purposes of comparing the theories and for the purposes of determining convergence.

Concerning (ii) a theory of *intuition* could maintain that *intuition* has a strong phenomenal nature that is presentational or it could maintain that *intuition* has no distinctive phenomenology that is important, rather what is important is how *intuition* is related to a belief or an inclination to believe a proposition or to some other process. The general idea here is that some conceptions of *intuition* will maintain that it has a strong phenomenology that is important, while others will acknowledge the presence of the phenomenology, but downplay the significance of it. The phenomenology of *intuition* is important because some views might hold that the positive epistemic status of intuitions depends in part on the phenomenology of *intuition*, while others would deny it. For important work on the epistemic role of the phenomenology of intuition see Eli Chudnoff’s (2014) _Intuition_.

Concerning (iii) a theory of *intuition* could maintain that there is a specific process that underlies *intuition* or that there are a variety of processes that account for *intuition*. At least some of the work that pertains to (iii) comes from cognitive science and neuroscience where theoretical models of cognition and FMRI are used to map which centers of the brain are responsible for the production of certain mental states, such as *intuition*. However, investigation of (iii) is also important for determining the issue of whether a use of *intuition* involves both
reason and emotion. For example, a use of *intuition* might maintain that it is wholly rational and not dependent on any emotive or affective processes either for its production or for its evidential status. Another account might maintain that *intuition* is important when it is a function of an emotive processes. For important work on whether or not 'intuition' talk picks out a common process or distinct processes see Jennifer Nado’s (2014) Why Intuition?

Concerning (iv) a theory of *intuition* could maintain that *intuition* is a source of justification or that *intuition* is not a source of justification. In addition, the important sub-questions here are: how is *intuition* a source of justification? Why is *intuition* not a source of justification? What kind of justification does *intuition* provide?

Concerning (v) a theory of *intuition* could maintain that *intuition* is not a source of knowledge or that *intuition* is a source of knowledge. The important sub-questions here are: if *intuition* is a source of knowledge, how exactly is it a source of knowledge? Is it a form of mediate or immediate knowledge? Is the knowledge a function of one possessing sufficient justification or is it a function of a direct connection or link to the truth-maker for the relevant truth that is known? Finally, if it is a function of a direct link how can that linked be established with respect to the relevant objects it is set over? For example, if intuition is set over temporal truths, some of which are in the future, how can a subject have an intuition that is a direct connection to a future event?

Concerning (vi) a theory of *intuition* could maintain that *intuition* is operative in the relevant sense only when the subject has undergone some kind of training or practice. Here the idea is that some theories of *intuition* will say that a genuine *intuition* is present when and only when training and practice has taken place. Other theories will acknowledge the presence of *intuition* even in the absence of training or practice. One further division that can be found with respect to training is whether or not the theory holds that training improves the epistemic quality of the *intuitions* one has or whether training is simply what is necessary to prepare the mind to have an *intuition* in the relevant domain. Finally, how a theory of *intuition* treats question (vi) is often related to how it treats (iv) and (v).

We will now take the dimension questions into the literature we have surveyed.

Proper Objects

Within the work on classical Indian philosophy that has been surveyed here, it is clear that there are at least five discussions of proper domains for *intuition*. First, there is the use of *intuition* in Nyāya that focuses on our knowledge of universals. Second, there is the use of *intuition* in Nyāya that focuses on a yogic perception as aimed at objects in the material world that are either hidden, distant, or subtle. Third, there is the use of *intuition* in Vaiśeṣika that discusses *intuition* as a way of accessing past, present, and future objects beyond the senses. Fourth, there is the use of *intuition* in Dharmañkriti where it is mainly focused on our knowledge of
the Four Noble Truths. Fifth, there is the use of *intuition* in Yoga, which is aimed at revealing ultimate truths of reality.

Phenomenal Nature

Within the work on classical Indian philosophy that has been surveyed here, relatively little is said about the phenomenology of *intuition*. We find that it is presented as being an excited state and one that involves a clear presentation of its object. The two most interesting features to point out come from the Buddhist thinkers. One main point they make is that *intuition* is to be related to states such as grief or hallucination. The other main claim that is made is that the vividness of yogaja prayākṣa is used as a basis for arguing that the content of *intuition* must be non-conceptual. The argument for this is the following:

1. Representational states that are vivid are non-conceptual.
2. Yogaja prayākṣa is representational.
3. So, yogaja prayākṣa is non-conceptual.

That is, rather than talking about the relative strength of various *intuitions* the focus of discussion is on the vividness of it. In contrast to this view, many accounts of *intuition* in moral philosophy, within Western philosophy, would treat *intuition* as having conceptual content. The main reason for supposing this to be the case is that *intuition* in Western moral philosophy is directed at a moral truth that is conceptually articulated and brought to consciousness as a judgment to the effect that something is true.

The fact that the Buddhist conception, articulated under Dharmakīrti, treats *intuitions* as having non-conceptual content is, from a cross-cultural-constructive engagement point of view, quiet challenging. For those working on *intuition* in the Western tradition it may seem unimaginable how *intuition* could have non-conceptual content in the moral case. While it is true in Kant that concepts and intuitions are opposed to one another in the construction of experience, and thus that there is a notion of *intuition* that is non-conceptual, Kant’s notion of an *intuition* is not the same one that is at play when we say, for example, that Bill has the intuition that Utilitarians give the correct answer to the Trolley Problem in which we are asked to determine whether we should kill one to save five. More importantly, though, the argument that Dharmakīrti offers for why *intuition* has non-conceptual content is very interesting and plausible. For, it is not uncommon to argue on the basis of the vividness of a representational state type that the kind of content that state type has is non-conceptual. Comes from the debate between John McDowell and Gareth Evans over whether perception has conceptual or non-conceptual content. McDowell (1996) argues that in order for perception to justify a belief, it must have conceptual content, since belief has conceptual content. However, Evans’s (1982) Varieties of Reference contains an argument where he argues on the basis of the richness of our perceptual experience that perception cannot have conceptual content, since we don’t have enough concepts to capture the fine-grained detail of our perceptual experience. One might wonder whether Dharmakīrti’s argument from vividness to non-conceptuality for *intuition* in
yogic perception similar to the founding idea of Evan’s argument that fine-grained detail of perceptual experience leads to the view that perception must be non-conceptual.

We can examine the potential equipollence of these arguments by looking into the cases of moral intuition and mathematical intuition. Our question is: how plausible is it to hold that moral intuitions are non-conceptual in the way that Dharmakirti seems to? A moral intuition, such as that it is wrong to torture a innocent individual for no other purpose than to cause suffering, is a strong conceptual intuition, in that it would appear that to have the intuition one must possess the concepts of torture, innocence, and suffering. By contrast, the intuition generated by a visual representation of how a closed-concave figure can be modified into the shape of a circle would appear to require no concepts—at least in the sense of being linguistically tied. Rather, it would appear to involve only the ability to see in one’s mind eye how a figure of a certain kind could be turned from closed concave figure into a circle. Thus, at least some mathematical *intuitions* arguably would appear to have non-conceptual content. Note that in both cases at least one concept is required, the concept of truth, since in both cases the *intuition* has the partial content either that something is true, such as in the moral case or that something is possible, such as in the mathematical case. So, we might conjecture the following. If Dharmakirti thinks of yogic perception *intuition* as a moral truths is like mathematical *intuition* rather than how contemporary Western philosophers think about moral intuitions concerning concrete situations, we would have a model to make sense of his account. In some ways the yogic perception *intuition* or suffering is like a mathematicians seeing with survivability the connectedness of various truths in mathematics in a given domain under a specific proof.

Finally, given this cross-cultural-constructive engagement, the most sensible position to take on the content of *intuitions* is that they can have both conceptual and non-conceptual content depending on the case in question. And that one must be sensitive to what kinds of concepts are being excluded or included in a treatment of the question: what kind of content does *intuition* have?

*Process*

The question of what process or processes underlie a specific use of *intuition* in most cases cannot be determined unless one looks at the actual psychological and neuroscientific data concerning the specific use of *intuition*. However, it is still possible to characterize three distinct views of the processes that generate *intuition*. The three views are: the rational account, the emotional account, and the interactive account.

The rational account maintains that *intuitions* are a product of a rational process. The rational account is most closely associated with mathematical discussions of *intuition*. It is so associated because it is thought that mathematical intuitions derive solely from a rational process. The more controversial case is the use of moral intuitions as discussed in our knowledge of fundamental moral truths. Some philosophers would argue that our moral intuitions do not derive solely from
a rational process. Rather, they derive from an emotional process working in conjunction with a rational process. These points about the controversy over moral intuitions bring us to the other two theories of *intuition*.

The emotional theory of intuition maintains that the processes that generate *intuition* are emotional and not rational. It is clear that an emotional theory of intuition is unlikely to be coherent in the domain of mathematical intuitions. It is far less clear that it could not be of substantial importance in the case of moral intuitions. The interactive theory holds that intuitions are a function of both rational and emotional processes. It is unclear whether a pure emotional theory of intuition is superior to an interactive theory for the case of moral intuitions. In addition, one could argue that all three theories are correct for different domains in which *intuition* occurs. And thus, as a consequence, there is no common kind that falls under the use of *intuition* in rational theories vs. emotional theories.

**Justification and Knowledge**

We will take the issues surrounding justification and knowledge together. The main reason why is that the biggest contrast between classical Indian and Western philosophical discussions about the epistemic status of *intuition* is that while there is an issue concerning justification on the basis of *intuition* in moral discussions in Western philosophy, there is no discussion of it in classical Indian philosophy. In classical Indian philosophy the main and central question concerns whether or not how *yogaja pratyakṣa* is a *pramāṇa*. At least one reason for the absent discussion concerning justification is that within classical Indian philosophy the following two views about sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) typically hold: (i) they are factive; and (ii) knowledge is non-compositional. Because *pramāṇa* are factive it must be the case that if *intuition* is a *pramāṇa*, then it is when one has an intuition the content of it is true. In addition, it will follow on this view that we can have *intuition* like experiences that are phenomenally similar, but not genuine *intuitions* because their content is not true. Because knowledge is non-compositional it must be the case that if *intuition* is a *pramāṇa*, it is not mediated by an intervening mental state. For example, in Western epistemology many philosophers take knowledge to factor into the following components: (a) truth, (b) belief, (c) justification, and (d) some anti luck condition strong enough to rule out Gettier cases. By contrast, in Indian philosophy, sources of knowledge are not typically taken to factor into distinct components. Rather, knowledge is taken to be a relation between the mind and the proper object it is set over.

Now, in the Western discussion of ethical intuitionism there is room both for discussion of justification and knowledge of basic moral truths on the basis of *intuition*. On the classical Indian side of the discussion the central question surrounds knowledge of moral truths by way of *intuition* as a way of

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21One should note however that there is literature within experimental philosophy and cognitive science that discusses the possible ways in which *intuitions* about moral cases depend not on rationality, but rather emotions or affective processes. See for example work by Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt.
distinguishing between knowledge that is gained through a teacher’s instruction versus knowledge that is gained on one’s own. (The episodes narrated from the Mahābhārata under the Yoga section bring this out most poignantly.) *Intuition* serves as a possible route for an individual to gain knowledge of moral truths independently of a teacher’s instruction. In addition, the knowledge of moral truths that one acquires has the features of being (i) direct, (ii) unmediated. However, with respect to the non-conceptuality of *intuitions* in the case of moral truths, it is not clear that every school of classical Indian thought would subscribe to this account. The Buddhist, under Dharmakīrti’s articulation, would. However, it is plausible that the Nyāya would hold that an *intuition* of a moral truth is conceptual.

Finally, the most interesting connection we can draw cross-culturally is that there is a connecting line through a famous problem in 20th century discussions in the philosophy of mathematics to discussions of ethical intuitionism all the way to Dharmakīrti’s discussion of *intuition* of the Four Noble Truths.

The central problem that one encounters in the Western context for thinking about how intuitive perception can be a source of knowledge or justification is the contact-problem, elsewhere known as the Benacerraf problem. The problem is initially presented for the case of mathematics, and then can be altered for the case of morality. The initial set up is based on a set of inconsistent claims:

(Causal Isolation) The truth-makers for mathematical statements, such as that $1 + 2 = 3$, are abstract objects which are causally isolated from humans.

(Causal Connection) Both justification for believing that $p$ and knowledge that $p$ require some kind of causal contact between the subject and the truth-maker for $p$.

(MAJK) We do possess some knowledge of mathematical truths, and we do have justification for believing many mathematical claims.

The claims above are inconsistent. For if (MAJK) is true, then either the truth-makers for mathematical statements are not causally isolated, or, neither justification nor knowledge require a causal connection between the subject and the truth-maker of the proposition. On the basis of taking a certain line in the philosophy of mathematics, namely that the truth-makers are causally isolated from human subjects, one could argue that mathematical intuition is useless as a basis for justifying mathematical beliefs or providing one with knowledge of mathematical truths. For one could argue that without a causal connection between humans and mathematical objects, which are the truth-makers for mathematical statements,

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22 See Benacerraf (1973) for the original articulation of this problem for the case of mathematics. One should note that the problem is more general than the one articulated by Benacerraf. Because the problem is more general it is being discussed here under title 'the contact problem.'
mathematical intuitions could not be reliable. The core idea is that reliability requires connection. The contact problem can be extended to the case of moral cognition. A simple formulation of it would be the following:

(Causal Isolation) The truth-makers for moral statements, such as that *causing innocents to suffer is morally wrong*, are universally understood as non-concrete entities.

(Causal Connection) Both justification for believing that \( p \) and knowledge that \( p \) require some kind of causal contact between the subject and the truth-maker for \( p \).

(MOJK) We do possess some knowledge of moral truths, and we do have justification for believing many moral claims.

On the moral account, if one maintains (MOJK), then it appears that we cannot know moral truths on the basis of moral intuition. For how does moral intuition put us into contact with the truth-makers for moral statements, abstract universals.

Now although this version of the problem is not present in classical Indian philosophy, Dunne’s discussion of Dharmakīrti engaged a certain problem within Buddhist philosophy. Recall the problem:

1. To realize the Truth of Suffering, one must realize the impermanence of everything, since the impermanence of everything is part of what constitutes the Truth of Suffering by being a cause of suffering for each thing that does suffer.
2. The impermanence of everything is not something over and above all things that are particular and impermanent. There is no real universal of impermanence, which everything participates in. Rather, impermanence is abstracted from the particular impermanence that each and every thing undergoes.
3. Yogic perception, being a perception, is only of particular things that can be causally efficacious in the production of an image in the mind.
4. So, it cannot be that in having a yogic perception of the Truth of Suffering one is put into contact with the universal *impermanence*.

In the case of our potential knowledge of the Truth of Suffering through yogic perception the problem is that we only have yogic perceptions of particulars, and not universals, since on the Buddhist ontology there are *no universals*. Dunne’s formulation of the problem is not done by way of a contact problem. But it can easily be formulated as such by the following argument.

(a) It is possible to have a yogic perception of the Truth of Suffering only if one has a connection to the universal of impermanence, which would provide them with contact to the relevant truth-maker for the truth of suffering.
(b) On the Buddhist ontology there are no universals.
(c) So, it is impossible to have a connection with the universal of *impermanence*.

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23For an account of rational intuition that challenges the problem presented via the contact-problem see Chudnoff (2014).
(d) So, it is impossible to have contact with the relevant truth-maker for the Truth of Suffering, which is necessary for having a yogic perception of the Truth of Suffering.

Thus, exploration of the moral case, cross-culturally, reveals a general problem concerning *intuition* and its objects. Namely: How can *intuition* be a source of knowledge, if the truths it is supposed to provide us knowledge of rest on a domain of objects that are inaccessible to human minds?

Training and Practice
The final dimension that must be explored is that of training and practice. And it is here that we find a feature that stretches across all schools of classical Indian philosophy. The core debate is over two features of training and practice: (a) whether training or practice is relevant to the issue of generating *intuitions* that can provide one either with justification or with knowledge, and (b) what kind of training or practice is relevant? In the classical Indian context there are several important features of the discussion on training.

First, the training is to be (a) ethical, (b) physical, and (c) mental. In the Yoga school, yogic perception requires that one both act in certain ways and abstain from acting in other ways. These ethical practices prepare one to have yogic perceptions. Yoga, itself, requires a physical practice of asana. These practices play a role in training the mind to be still. It is theorized that the physical practices place the body in a position that allows one to train the mind in being focused because the body being in that position makes the mind want to move about. Of course asana practice is not just about the stilling of the mind, since asanas also provide other positive benefits. But in relation to *intuition* this is the primary purpose. And finally meditation is necessary in order to still the mind when the body is not in a difficult position. The core idea across all three of these is that certain practices prepare the mind by training it to have *intuitions* that are of a certain epistemic quality.

Second, the training would appear to be domain general. In the case of mathematics, one would argue that training in mathematics alone is what is relevant to having mathematical intuitions that are reliable and trustworthy for forming mathematical beliefs and gaining mathematical knowledge. But perhaps one would hold off on arguing that training the mind in general is an important step towards gaining reliability within the mathematical domain.24 By contrast, in the case of the Yoga School there are two ideas of relevance. Training the mind in general is relevant for having *intuitions* in general. But also training the mind to focus has a spill over effect into many other aspects of one’s life. Not just in areas that pertain to

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24 The claim we make here about the relation between training the mind in general versus training the mind in mathematics is a conjecture about what some philosophers of mathematics might say. We take it that some, perhaps influenced by Husserl, would say that training the mind in general is also an important step towards having reliable mathematical intuitions. And that those influenced by work in philosophy of mind on the role of attention in perception, would likewise claim that training the mind to be attentive in general is an important step toward having reliable mathematical intuitions.
domain specific *intuitions* such as in the areas of morality, mathematics, or metaphysics.

From a cross-cultural point of view the key insight that is to be gained is that a theory of how *intuition* can be a source of justification or knowledge might be further investigated by looking into how training the mind in general either positively or negatively effects one's *intuitions* in specific domains. It could be that by training the mind in general to be attentive and focused, and to engage extended concentration one is able to have *intuitions* with a stronger phenomenal and epistemic quality.

Concluding Remarks

Both intuition and perception are prominent features of our cognitive lives. It is striking to find so many treatments of perception from a cross-cultural-constructive point of view in comparison to the total absence of any in the field of intuition.\footnote{For an example of an excellent recent work on perception from a cross-cultural-constructive point of view see Coseru (2012). In this work Coseru develops a Buddhist account of perception while also engaging work from Western epistemology and philosophy of mind as well as neuroscience and cognitive science.}

The present study aims to rectify that problem with the hope of encouraging more cross-cultural-constructive works on intuition. Some areas in which there could be more development are the following.

From a historical point of view it would be interesting to see work comparing historical discussions of *intuition* in Western philosophy with specific schools of classical Indian philosophy. Potential comparisons could engage various members of the Nyāya School, such as Gaṅgeśa and Udayana, with various Western rationalists, such as Descartes and Spinoza.

From a cognitive science point of view it would be interesting to see work that brings *intuition* as discussed by Kahneman (2011) into contact with any of the schools of Indian thought that discuss different ways in which one can train the mind to have trustworthy *intuitions*.

From a comparative philosophical point of view it would also be interesting to see more work exploring the different processes that bring about *intuition* as discussed here under the topic of reason and emotion. It is likely the case that comparative examination of both emotion and intuition would be highly useful to enhancing our understanding of *intuitions* as generated by emotion as opposed to those generated by reason. Rational intuition has received far more attention in the recent literature than the topic of emotional intuition.

Finally, it is important to close this study by engaging the question: why is a cross-cultural-constructive engagement of a phenomenon useful? There are perhaps many answers to this question, both positive and negative. We will close with a positive answer reflecting our own theory.
A cross-cultural-constructive engagement of a phenomenon is useful because it plays an instrumental role in enhancing our understanding of the phenomenon. Understanding a phenomenon fully and robustly requires approaching the phenomenon from as many points of view as that phenomenon allows for. **Intuition** being a pervasive feature of the human condition surely admits of a cross-cultural investigation, as opposed to simply a scientific investigation or theoretical investigation. A cross-cultural investigation sits alongside an empirical and a theoretical (a priori or non-experimental) investigation. It does not override the latter two investigations. Rather, it complements both. As we seek a theory of *intuition* we seek it from every corner from which it has been investigated and theorized about.

Another significant outcome of a cross-cultural engagement might be the critical pay-offs. What we mean by this is that—as we began to argue in the introductory section—far too often philosophers and intellectuals generally hold an extremely polarized picture of the West and the East, roughly paralleling the erstwhile distinction between reason, on the one side, and passions, mystical forebodings, meditation, and such other esoteric pursuits or predilections, on the other side. Philosophy in the West is supposed to be built on a solid foundation of science, reason and argumentation. The truth of course is that these distinctions and the cleavage painted are suspect and ultimately misleading. Form our discussion of the Indian approaches to *intuition* (and from our other work on metaphysics and epistemologies of India) it should be apparent that there is as much difference and diversity within Indian philosophical traditions (or for that matter Chinese) as there is in Western traditions, from Ancient Philosophy to Continental and post-secular philosophies. Second, that reason, logic and argumentation are not just the provenance of the West; these art-forms were rigorously practiced and developed in India (and in the works of Indian philosophers spread-out more globally today). Thirdly, what is lost in the accounts of the history of philosophy is that much of the influences that aided if not propelled the growth of philosophy in what is nowadays considered as the ‘West’ came from the infiltration of or borrowings from Indo-Aryan ideas (to the East as much as to the West of their original home in Central Asia). Many parts of Europe extending out from Russia were considered as integral to the “Orient” (hence the use of ‘Oriental’ for ‘Orthodox’ that is still current in some parts of that world); and Germany was very much part of the ‘East’ or the ‘Orient’ until it was transformed in the Middle Ages through an infusion of Indo-Aryan and Hellenistic ideas.

Furthermore, mysticism of many kinds, and in some instances of quite wild varieties, was still rife between 16–19th century Germany, and few philosophers of the period could escape the temptations, including Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, to name a few. One might even venture to suggest that the contemporary (rekindled) interest in the West in ESP, Psi, and paranormal cognition, have their roots in the ‘Western’ cultures of the Romantic period; that phenomenon such as psycho-kinesis, clairvoyance, precognition, including psychic-spiritual

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mediumship, were known and widely practiced in these cultures (frowned upon, of course, by the churches, that led to gruesome ‘witch-hunting’). Their roots in the academic thinking went back to Paracelsus, whose epistemology was based on the integration of three modes of ‘knowing’: empirical, scientific, and intuitive—where the last two supervene sequentially on each of the prior methods: thus one has an intuitive understanding (experientiâ) of the property of the object known (scientiâ), that is encountered by the senses (experimentum). This surfaces more in Kant’s schemata of the categories of understanding than in his use of the trope ‘intuition’ (for sensation qua experimentum).\textsuperscript{27} Kant, who was influenced in no small measure by the mystic ‘first German philosopher’, Boehme, is reported to have pondered on the possibility of a ‘sixth’ (extra-ordinary) sense, and invited the Swedish seer Swedenborg to show him the apparent workings of the occult sense, though the experiment failed and Kant remained unconvinced (in theory at least). Several 19th century scientists, such as Wolfgang Pauli, drew on spiritual or occult archetypes to even explain Kepler’s configurations of the heavens. 20th century physicists such as Julian Huxley, Schrödinger, Eddington, Oppenheimer, perhaps also Einstein—not to mention the renown Indian mathematician in Cambridge, Ramanujan—showed strong leanings towards transcendent metaphysics (some drawing on the Indian Upaniṣads). From this basis they arguably ventured scientific conjectures and proffered predictions as well that awaited empirical or mathematical verifications; such ‘non-scientific dabbling’, some might call it, nevertheless influenced their scientific thinking as much as their regular life-styles.

Constructive comparative philosophy, then, can be seen to play a crucial role in disabusing the moderns of the simplistic and over-determined view that because theories of intuition are (historically in the West) grounded in occult metaphysics, they have no relevance to or impact upon how one does science, or philosophy for that matter, and that the discourse should, if not already has been, relegated to the dustbins of the ancient world to the ‘East’. When in fact the history and career of intuition in the East has been quite the opposite.

Drawing on an analogy, at one time this also was said of emotions and passions, and also more generally of ethics or moral philosophy; but this all changed in contemporary times, and as a result of interventions from many quarters, some rather interesting work has been done in cross-cultural studies of emotions, not just by anthropologists and psychologists, but by philosophers also, so that we begin to better understand and appraise the claims of the universality of emotions, or at least of certain of the emotional responses, sentiments and passions, and how these form part of moral judgments (an area we cannot go further into here, but touched upon in an earlier section) (Solomon 1995). So it behooves modern-day philosophy not to regard constructive comparative philosophy to be a tangential or irrelevant pursuit in our quest towards understanding some of the common threads that just might run through the cultures and philosophies of the plural worlds, near and far.

\textsuperscript{27}See Gibbons 2001: 11, 15, 52, and 91.
Raimon Panikkar, writing in the 1980-90s, drew attention to a further virtue of CQI, by adding another methodological element to the erstwhile practice, and this he labeled, the ‘imparative hermeneutic’. ‘Imparative’ is derived from the Latin impayare, to implore, to confront. He explained that in this method a real space of mutual criticism and fecundation is opened up for genuine encounters between different philosophical and cultural traditions. One ‘enters’ into another’s dimensions of intellectual or cultural ‘meaning’, and allows that to speak to (and reappraise) one’s own convictions in a dialogical situation. One then assumes a neutral vantage point from which assessment is made of the comparative worth of the aspects investigated. In Panikkar’s view, this provides a needed antidote to the kind of ‘mono-formist’ culture of philosophy that hitherto has all but sounded the death-knell of the rich and varied particularities of the various philosophical and cultural traditions, globally extant, each of which may have something unique to offer. Thus, he views the larger objective of the Imparative-hermeneutic program to draw into dialogue different perspectives (from among the various traditions) to address real-life and global issues in such a way that comparisons can become relevant to the human condition, to the problems and crises that face humankind regardless of whether religions are implicated or not. Imparative philosophy proposes that ‘we may ... learn by being ready to undergo the different philosophical experiences of other people’ Panikkar (1988: 127). Associated with such imparative work is the recognition that nothing is nonnegotiable Panikkar (1988: 128). Panikkar suggests that imparative philosophy employs in this regard diatopical hermeneutics. Departing from morphological hermeneutics—distance within one single culture—and diachronic hermeneutics—temporal distance à la Hegel—diatopical hermeneutics is ‘the required method of interpretation when the distance to overcome ... is ... the distance between two (or more) cultures, which have independently developed different spaces (topoi) their own methods of philosophizing and ways of reaching intelligibility along with their proper categories’ Panikkar (1988: 130).

Panikkar is suggesting that there is a phenomenology implicit in this cross-cultural enterprise, and this calls upon the researcher’s conscious engagement with empathy and a preparedness to bracket-out belief in the truth of one or the other position that does not allow for a possible third position suggested in the imparare encounter that takes into account the universal range of human experience in as much as it is possible to do so in any concrete situation. Imparative philosophy as an alternative to comparative philosophy may be the antidote to overcoming parochialism, as well as to cultivating tolerance and understanding of the richness of human experience. And here diatopical hermeneutics has the functional role of forging a common universe of discourse (not a common ground through assumed equivalences) in the dialogical dialogue that is taking place in the very encounter. So, Panikkar basically argues that cross-cultural philosophy is a ‘mature ontonomic activity of the human spirit, contrasting everything, learning from everywhere, and radically criticizing the enterprise itself’ Panikkar (1988: 136).
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